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ABSTRACT
In 2011, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the California law
proscribing the sale of violent video games to minors violated the First
Amendment and was, therefore, unconstitutional. Because this is the first video
game case to be heard by the Supreme Court, the decision marked a significant
milestone for the video game and entertainment industries. The beginning of this
note will review the history leading up to the passage of the law as well as examine
previous attempts by other states to regulate the distribution of violent video games
to minors. Most importantly, this note will explore the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association including the Court’s analysis of
the applicable constitutional law. Lastly, this note will examine the California
law’s potential impact on the video game industry had it been deemed
constitutional.
I. INTRODUCTION
A man holding a gasoline can stands in the middle of a mall. Suddenly, he
begins pouring the contents of the can onto the floor and onto people waiting
patiently in line to meet a celebrity. Then, the man lights a match and throws it
onto the trail of gasoline igniting the blaze. People begin to burst into flames as
screams and cries of pain erupt. The man who started it all, then pulls out a gun
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and takes aim at the flame engulfed figures that have become scattered around the
mall. He then proceeds to use the flaming bodies as target practice. After the
flames have burned out, the villain leaves the mall, walking over the charred
corpses. He makes his way to a church, where he proceeds to the confessional and
his voice echoes, “Bless me father for I have really sinned . . . .” At this time, he
pulls out his gun and begins firing shots at the priest through the partition. 1
The Supreme Court has ruled that the video game described above cannot be
proscribed from minors despite its violent content. 2 While the imagery may be
disturbing, it is just one of the many scenarios that play out in the video game,
Postal 2. 3 The Supreme Court’s holding rendered such interactive violence as
fully protected by the First Amendment, and more importantly, that it is
unconstitutional to prohibit the sale of these types of violent video games to
minors. 4
In 2005, California passed legislation intended to prevent such games from
being distributed to minors. 5 Postal 2, however, is the only video game that was
clearly identified as banned under California’s statute. 6 Although California has
been permanently enjoined from enforcing the law since 2005, 7 the State
successfully appealed the case all the way to the United States Supreme Court in
2010. 8 In its most recent term, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments from both
* Laura Black is a J.D. Candidate 2012 at Pepperdine University School of Law. She received her B.A.
from the University of Pennsylvania. She currently serves on the Moot Court Board and is a Palmer
Center fellow.
1
BonersGames, Postal 2 – Share the Pain – Tuesday [2/2], YOUTUBE.COM (Aug. 16, 2007),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nmA_LmAy7mY&feature=related.
2
Brown v. Entm’t. Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
3
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950
(9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1448).
4
Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 2729.
5
See CAL. CIV. CODE §§1746–1746.5 (West 2005).
6
In California’s brief on petition for certiorari, the State reports other scenes of violence
demonstrated in Postal 2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 46–47, Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (No.
08-1448). Specifically, the game features scenes of:
[T]orturing images of young girls, setting them on fire, and bashing their brains
out with a shovel, for no reason other than to accumulate more points in the
game. In one scene . . . the player . . . looks through a scope on an assault rifle
and sees a very realistic image of a person’s face. The player then shoots the
victim in the kneecap. As the player watches the victim attempt to crawl away,
moaning in pain, the player pours gasoline on the victim and lights him on fire.
As the burning victim continues to crawl, the player urinates on the victim, and
says “That’s the ticket.” After noting that it “smells like chicken,” the player
again looks at the victim through the scope on the gun, and again sees a realistic
human face, on fire, crawling toward him. The player then shoots the victim in
the face, which turns into charred remnants of a human image. In another scene,
the player hits a woman in the face with a shovel, causing blood to gush from her
face. As she cries out and kneels down, the player hits her twice more with the
shovel, this time decapitating her. The player then proceeds to hit the headless
corpse several more times, each time propelling the headless corpse through the
air while it continues to bleed.
Id.
7
See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
8
Gregory Boyd, Video Game Regulation and the Supreme Court: Schwarzenegger v.
Entertainment Merchants Association, GAMASUTRA 1 (Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.gamasutra.com/view/
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the State of California and the Entertainment Merchants Association and rendered
its decision on June 27, 2011. 9 This is the first video game case to be heard by the
United States Supreme Court. 10 It is the goal of this note to explore the recent
opinion issued by the Supreme Court as well as examine the potential impact on
the video game industry if the law had been deemed constitutional. In Part II, this
note reviews the history of governmental concern with portrayals of violence being
viewed by minors. Part II also explains the video game ratings system and the
video game industry’s policy of self regulation. Part III summarizes the relevant
constitutional law including the obscenity standard and the protections of the First
Amendment. Part IV explores and analyzes previous attempts by other states to
regulate the distribution of violent video games to minors. Part V summarizes the
Ninth Circuit’s decision leading up to the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari.
Next, Part VI details the Supreme Court’s decision and analysis including the
concurring and dissenting opinions. Although, the Supreme Court ultimately
affirmed California’s law as unconstitutional, Part VII explores the potential
affects such a law would have on the video game industry. And finally, Part VIII
is a brief conclusion commenting on society’s concern with violent media.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of Government Involvement and Industry Self-Regulation
Public and political concern with portrayals of violence in the entertainment
industry is nothing new. 11 Beginning in the 1990s, a number of studies and special
interest groups began to emerge espousing the potentially damaging long-term
effects of young people viewing violent media. 12 This specific concern with
children viewing violence only gained momentum throughout the 1990s during
which time there were a number of widely publicized incidents of teens reenacting
violence they had previously witnessed, 13 ultimately culminating with the 1999

feature/6191/video_game_regulation_and_the_.php.
9
See Transcript of Oral Argument, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 130 S. Ct. 2398
(2010) (No. 08-1448); Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729.
10
See Stephen Totilo, All You Need to Know About This Week’s Violent Video Game Case in the
U.S. Supreme Court, GIZMODO (Nov. 1, 2010), http://kotaku.com/5678354/all-you-need-to-knowabout-this-weeks-violent-video-game-case-in-the-us-supreme-court.
11
Thomas A. Hemphill, Self-regulation, public issue management and marketing practices in the
Entertainment Industry, 3 J. PUB. AFF. 338, 338–57 (2003), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/10.1002/pa.162/pdf; FTC Releases Report on the Marketing of Violent Entertainment to Children,
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Sept.11, 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/09/youthviol.shtm.
12
See Hemphill, supra note 11, at 339.
13
See Tara Kole, Advertising Entertainment: Can Government Regulate Advertising, 9 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 315, 315–16 (2002). In 1995, Sarah Edmonson and her boyfriend, Benjamin Darrus,
inspired by the film Natural Born Killers, went on a cross-country crime spree during which they
paralyzed one victim and murdered another. Id. In 1997, a high school freshmen went on a rampage,
shooting teachers and students at his school after viewing the movie, The Basketball Diaries. Id. In
1996 in Moses Lake, WA, Barry Loukaitis began shooting teachers and classmates during his algebra
class and ultimately killed three people. Katherine Ramsland, Movies Made Me Murder, TRU TV,
http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/criminal_mind/psychology/movies_made_me_kill/4.html
(last
visited Nov. 7, 2011). Loukaitis later claimed he was inspired by a music video from Pearl Jam called
“Jeremy,” which depicted a student taking guns to school and shooting people. Id.
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Columbine High School shootings. 14 On April 20, 1999, two teenagers brought
weapons to Columbine High School and began a violent siege during which they
killed thirteen people (twelve students and one teacher) and wounded many others,
until finally turning the guns on themselves. 15 Subsequent investigations into the
lives of the shooters revealed their obsession with the video game, Doom, a first
person shooter. 16
As a result of this link between the shooters and a violent video game, the
public outcry and concern about the effects of violent media on children was
renewed prompting the government to take a closer look at regulations in the
entertainment industry. 17 Prior to the events at Columbine, federal regulations of
violence were fairly limited. 18 In the early ‘90s, concerns with expressions of
violence in popular music lyrics and television programming resulted in a report by
the American Psychological Association (“APA”) revealing the long-term effects
of children viewing violence. 19 The potential damage to children reported by the
APA and other similar studies prompted Congressional hearings between 1994 and
1995 to decide what should be done to address these issues. 20 In response to these
federal investigations, the major television networks agreed to take a closer look at
their programming and undertake stricter policies of self-regulation. 21 An
agreement was also reached between the television networks and the government
concerning the installation of a “V-chip,” which allowed parents to regulate what
programs and channels their child could watch. 22 But after the Columbine High
School shootings in 1999, these previous regulations were not enough to satisfy the
governmental inquiry into the effects of children viewing violence. 23
The extreme violence exhibited by the Columbine shootings prompted

14
Thomas A Hemphill, The Entertainment Industry, Marketing Practices, and Violent Content:
Who’s Minding the Children?, 108 BUS. & SOC. REV. 263, 263 (2003), available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8594.00164/pdf [hereinafter Hemphill II]; see also
Gregory Kenyota, Thinking of the Children: The Failure of Violent Video Game Laws, 18 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J., 785, 790–92; Kole, supra note 13, at 316.
15
James Brooke, Terror in Littleton: The Overview; 2 Students in Colorado High School said to
Gun Down as many as 23 and Kill Themselves in a Siege, N.Y. TIMES (April 21, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/21/us/terror-littleton-overview-2-students-colorado-school-said-gundown-many-23-kill.html?ref=columbinehighschool (calling the event, “the deadliest school massacre in
the nation’s history”); see also Kenyota, supra note 14, at 790–91; Jennifer Rosenberg, Columbine
Massacre, ABOUT.COM. http://history1900s.about.com/od/famouscrimesscandals/a/columbine.htm (last
visited Nov. 7, 2011) (describing the Columbine High School shootings and the shooters in detail).
16
Kenyota, supra note 14, at 790–91. A first person shooter is a video game genre in which the
player sees the game in from a first-person point of view and has a focus on shooting opponents. Niko
Silvester, First Person Shooter, ABOUT.COM, http://psp.about.com/od/pspglossary/g/firstpersshodef.htm
(last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
17
Kenyota, supra note 14, at 791; Kole, supra note 13,,316.
18
Hemphill, supra note 11, at 339.
19
Id. at 339. These effects included “(1) increased aggressiveness and anti-social behavior, (2)
increased fear of being or becoming a victim, (3) increased decentralization to violence and victims of
violence, and (4) increased appetite for more and more violence in entertainment and real life.” Id.
20
Id.; see also Hemphill II, supra note 14, at 263.
21
Hemphill II, supra note 14, at 264.
22
Id.
23
Id.
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President Bill Clinton to intervene. 24 The President called upon the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) 25 and the U.S. Department of Justice to conduct a study on
the practices of the entertainment industry soliciting violence to children. 26
Specifically, President Clinton asked these agencies to investigate two questions:
“[f]irst, do the industries promote products they themselves acknowledge warrant
parental caution in venues where children make up a substantial percentage of the
audience? Second, are these advertisements intended to attract children and
teenagers?” 27 The FTC answered both of these questions in the affirmative and
published a report of its findings. 28 In its report the FTC stated that, based on its
research, “a majority of the investigations into the impact of media violence on
children find that there is a high correlation between exposure to media violence
and aggressive, and at times violent, behavior.” 29 It also found research that
reported, “exposure to media violence is correlated with increased acceptance of
violent behavior in others, as well as an exaggerated perception of the amount of
violence in society.” 30
In its report, the FTC acknowledged the positive steps taken through the selfregulation programs developed in each respective industry, 31 but it also found that
entertainment companies often market their products to children who are not in the
appropriate age group designated by the company’s own rating or label. 32 This
contradiction between ratings and marketing tactics was the focus of the FTC’s
report as well as the ease with which underage children could access materials

24
Id.; see also Marketing Violent Entertainment to Children: A Review of Self-Regulation and
Industry Practices in the Motion Picture, Music Recording & Electronic Game Industries, FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, 1 (Sept. 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/violence/vioreport.pdf [hereinafter
FTC Report 2000] (specifically discussing the impact of the Columbine shootings on prompting
government action).
25
The FTC was established in 1914 with the primary purpose of preventing unfair methods of
competition in business as a part of the “bust the trusts” battle. About the Federal Trade Commission,
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last visited Nov. 7, 2010). Since
then, the authority of the agency has expanded and the FTC now strives to achieve:
[E]ffective law enforcement; advances consumers’ interests by sharing its
expertise with federal and state legislatures and U.S. and international
government agencies; develops policy and research tools through hearings,
workshops, and conferences; and creates practical and plain-language educational
programs for consumers and businesses in a global marketplace with constantly
changing technologies.
Id.
26
See Hemphill II, supra note 14, at 263. These industries specifically included the musical
recording, movie, and computer and video game industries. Id.
27
Id.
28
Hemphill, supra note 11, at 340.
29
FTC Report 2000, supra note 24, at ii.
30
Id.
31
Hemphill II, supra note 14, at 264. Each segment of the entertainment industry has established
self-regulation agencies. Id. These include the Motion Picture Association for motion pictures, the
National Association of Broadcasters for television programming, the Recording Industry Association
of America for musical recordings, and the Interactive Digital Software Association and Electronic
Software Rating Board for video games. Id.
32
FTC Report 2000, supra note 24, at i.
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expressly labeled for older audiences. 33 The FTC also mentioned the importance
of implementation of such self-regulation programs by companies in the
entertainment industry when “considering the First Amendment protections that
prohibit government regulation of content in most instances.” 34 With these First
Amendment protections in mind, the FTC came up with a three part conclusion to
enhance the self-regulatory programs already in place. 35 First, the “industry
should establish or expand codes that prohibit target marketing and impose
sanctions for violations.” 36 Second, the entertainment “industry should improve
the self-regulatory system compliance at the retail level.” 37 And lastly, the
“industry should increase parental awareness of the ratings and labels.” 38
Following publication of the 2000 report, Congress requested that the FTC
conduct a follow up report in order to monitor the progress of the entertainment
industry’s self-regulation efforts. 39 Since that time, the FTC has conducted and
issued six follow-up reports in order to oversee the progress and practices the
entertainment industry has made in preventing underage children from viewing
violent media. 40 In its latest report, issued in December 2009, the FTC concluded
that while there is room for improvement the “video game industry outpaces the
movie and music industries in the three key areas that the Commission has been
studying for the past decade: (1) restricting target-marketing of mature-rated
products to children; (2) clearly and prominently disclosing rating information; and
(3) restricting children’s access to mature-rated products at retail.” 41 In light of the
conclusion that the video game industry has been making strides through its selfregulation efforts to prevent violent games from wrongfully being viewed by

33

Id.
Id. at ii.
35
Hemphill II, supra note 14, at 265; see also FTC Report 2000, supra note 24, at 54–56.
36
FTC Report 2000, supra note 24, at 65. With respect to this first action, the FTC recommended
that the entertainment industry take measures that included prohibiting marketing of more mature rated
products to audiences that are made up of a substantial percentage of persons under the age of 17,
auditing ad placement to ensure these marketing limitations are actually taking place, and providing a
“no buy” list to media retailers. Id.
37
Id. at 66. The FTC listed several methods that industry members as well as third party retailers
should practice including checking identification or requiring parental permission prior to selling or
renting mature labeled titles, avoiding sales on websites unless they have a reliable age verification
system, and finally, establishing guidelines for electronic transfer of media so that such transfers do not
undermine the use of parental advisory labels. Id.
38
Id. To accomplish this goal, the FTC recommended that ratings or advisory labels and
descriptors should be clearly displayed in all ads and on all packaging. In addition, labeling and rating
information should be included in reviews and ratings should be displayed anywhere media can be
sampled, purchased or downloaded including the Internet. Id.
39
See Hemphill II, supra note 14, at 265.
40
All the reports can be accessed via the Federal Trade Commission’s website under the
Commission and Staff Reports page. The overall organization and structure of the reports are consistent
and include a specific section for the three investigated industries: motion pictures, music recording,
and electronic games. Marketing Violent Entertainment to Children: A Sixth Follow-up Review of
Industry Practices in the Motion Picture, Music Recording & Electronic Game Industries, FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, 1 (Dec. 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/12/P994511violententertainment.pdf
[hereinafter FTC Follow-Up Report 2009]; see generally Commission and Staff Reports, FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/reports/index.shtm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
41
FTC Follow-Up Report 2009, supra note 40, at 30.
34
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underage children, it seems California’s legislation banning the sale of violent
games to minors is an overreaction. 42
B. The Video Game Industry and Ratings
There is no denying the popularity and pervasiveness of the video game
industry. According to the Entertainment Software Association (“ESA”), “68% of
American households now play video games, with three quarters of all gamers age
18 or older.” 43 In 2010, video game sales totaled around $15.5 billion, not
including sales of video game consoles. 44 Although sales in 2010 did not increase
from sales in 2009, it was still a large increase when compared to the $11.7 billion
in revenue from 2008. 45 Based on last year’s sales, the industry has seen a rise in
the sale of mobile game applications and other new technology formats. 46 In
addition social gaming and online gaming have become increasingly popular as
more people join social networks such as Facebook. 47 The video game industry is
continually expanding as new platforms and technologies become available, such
as the gesture based control system, the Kinect for Xbox 360. 48
As more and more video game content is created, the more important the
Entertainment Software Rating Board (“ESRB”) game ratings become. The ESRB
is a non-profit, self-regulatory agency that was established by the ESA in 1994. 49
The ESRB rating is voluntary; meaning video games are not legally required to
carry an ESRB rating. 50 However, most retailers and distributors have policies to
only carry and stock ESRB rated games. 51 The ESRB currently has seven ratings
symbols that suggest the appropriate age for the player of the game as well as
content descriptors, which indicate the presence of certain elements in a game that
may be of interest or concern to parents. 52 The rating symbols include: Early
Childhood (“EC”), Everyone (“E”), Everyone 10 and older (“E10+”), Teen (“T”),
Mature (“M”), Adults Only (“AO”), and Rating Pending (“RP”). 53 There are 30
42

See infra notes 337–39.
FTC Follow-Up Report 2009, supra note 40, at 23.
44
Jessica Mintz, US sales of video game content flat in 2010, YAHOO! NEWS (Jan. 13, 2011),
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/US-sales-of-video-game-apf-2637529385.html?x=0&.v=2.
45
Id.; see FTC Follow-Up Report 2009, supra note 40, at 23.
46
Mintz, supra note 44.
47
See Dean Takahashi, The top 12 trends of the video game industry, GAMESBEAT (May 15,
2009), http://venturebeat.com/2009/05/15/the-top-12-trends-of-the-video-game-industry/.
48
Id.
49
ESRB Frequently Asked Questions, ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE RATING BOARD, http://www.
esrb.org/ratings/faq.jsp#1 (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Game Ratings & Descriptor Guide, ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE RATING BOARD, http://www.
esrb.org/ratings/ratings_guide.jsp#rating_symbols (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
53
Id. Early Childhood ratings are suitable for children ages 3 and over, and contain no content that
a parent would find inappropriate. Id. Titles rated for Everyone contains content suitable for children
ages 6 and over, and such titles can contain minimal cartoon or fantasy violence as well as mild
language. Id. Everyone 10 and older ratings indicate the content is appropriate for children ages 10 and
over, but may contain mild violence and language. Id. Teen rated titles are appropriate for children
ages 13 and older and may contain “violence, suggestive themes, crude humor, minimal blood,
43
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different content descriptors that cover a range of elements from violence and
sexual content to alcohol and drug use. 54 The purpose of such content descriptors
is to provide consumers with additional information about content in the game, but
they are not intended to list every type of content in a game that a player might
encounter. 55 Furthermore, the absence of a content descriptor does not necessarily
mean that type of content is completely nonexistent in the game, and such
descriptors do not “always refer to precisely the same type or intensity of material
depending on the rating category that accompanies it.” 56 Thus, the meaning of the
content descriptors is dependent upon the rating of the game.
Over the past five years, M-rated video games have only accounted for an
average of 9% of total video game sales. 57 E-ratings, however, have taken up
nearly 51% of game sales in the same time period. 58 T-rated titles average 23% of
sales while E10+ rated games average 17% of sales. 59 In addition, almost every
year E-rated titles outsell both M-rated and T-rated titles combined. 60 Although Erated titles consistently take up a majority of the market sales, the number one
selling game in 2010 was an M-rated game called Call of Duty: Black Ops. 61 This
game sold more than twelve million units in the United States, which was nearly
double the sales of the next best selling game, Madden NFL 11, an E-rated game. 62
Of the top ten selling games across all platforms for 2010, 63 five titles were rated
M, while four titles were rated E and one title was rated E10+. 64 These sales

simulated gambling, and/or infrequent use of strong language.” Id. Mature rated titles are intended for
audiences 17 and older, and often include violence, blood and gore, sexual content and strong language.
Id. Adults only ratings are intended only for audiences 18 and over, and may contain “prolonged scenes
of intense violence and/or graphic sexual content and nudity.” Id. Lastly, rating pending symbol refers
to titles that have been submitted to the ESRB, but have not yet received a final rating. Id. The RP
rating only occurs in advertisements for games that have not yet been released. Id.
54
See Id. Often content descriptors are preceded by the term “Mild,” which means that the type of
content is low in frequency or intensity. Id.
55
Id.
56
See ESRB Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 49.
57
Ben Reeves, Rated for Sale, GAMEINFORMER, Nov. 2010, at 23.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Jim Reilly, The Best Selling Games of 2010, IGN (Jan. 14, 2011), http://wii.ign.com/articles/
110/1107080p1.html.
62
Id.; Madden NFL 11, IGN, http://wii.ign.com/objects/043/043556.html (last visited Nov. 7,
2011).
63
“Across all platforms” means games play on all game consoles including Xbox 360, PlayStation
3, PlayStation 2, and Wii, as well as personal computers (PC) and portable game players.
64
Reilly, supra note 61; Rating Information: Halo Reach, ESRB, http://www.esrb.org/
ratings/synopsis.jsp?Certificate=29447 (last visited Nov. 11, 2011); Rating Information: New Super
Mario Bros. Wii, ESRB, http://www.esrb.org/ratings/synopsis.jsp?Certificate=27877 (last visited Nov.
11, 2011); Rating Information: Red Dead Redemption, ESRB, http://www.esrb.org/ratings/
synopsis.jsp?Certificate=28989 (last visited Nov. 11, 2011); Rating Information: Wii Fit Plus, ESRB,
http://www.esrb.org/ratings/synopsis.jsp?Certificate=27003 (last visited Nov. 11, 2011); Rating
Information: Just Dance 2, ESRB, http://www.esrb.org/ratings/synopsis.jsp?Certificate=29739&
searchkeyword=just dance 2 (last visited Nov. 11, 2011); Rating Information: Call of Duty: Modern
Warfare 2, ESRB, http://www.esrb.org/ratings/synopsis.jsp?Certificate=27566 (last visited Nov.11,
2011); NBA 2K11-final boxart, ESRB rating, GONINTENDO (Sept. 27, 2010), http://gonintendo.com/
viewstory.php?id=137420.
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figures show that while M-rated titles may only account for about 10% of total
video game sales, such titles are still widely popular and fly off the shelves.
The difficulty with California’s legislation is that it does not take the ESRB
ratings into account when classifying games as “violent.”. Thus, content given a Trating by the ESRB, may still be considered a “violent video game” under
California’s statute. Such contradictory determinations between the state and the
ESRB would most likely create vast consumer confusion. Additionally, the
ambiguity in the process of determining what games are considered regulated for
the purposes of California’s law will most certainly lead to self-censoring by the
video game industry, which will not want to risk prosecution. 65
C. Legislative History
California Civil Code §§1746-1746.5 were signed into law by Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger in 2005. 66 However, the Video Software Dealers
Association (“VSDA”) and the Entertainment Merchants Association (“EMA”)
brought a suit in the Northern District of California against the state seeking to
permanently enjoin enforcement of the law. 67 Subsequently, VSDA and EMA
filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted. 68 California filed a
timely appeal in the Ninth Circuit to reverse the district court’s decision. 69 The
State argued that the California statute constitutionally regulated the distribution of
violent video games. 70 The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed and affirmed the
district court’s order in 2009. 71 The State of California once again appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States, and, somewhat surprisingly, the petition for
certiorari was granted. 72
On November 2, 2010, the Supreme Court heard the case. 73 Deciding
whether the statute adequately describes the types of games to be regulated is only
one problem the Supreme Court must address in its decision. Additionally, the
Court must determine whether California’s statute is unconstitutional based on
whether it violates the First Amendment and whether it is invalid on vagueness

65

See infra text accompanying notes 364–402.
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746–1746.5.
67
Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 955–56 (9th Cir. 2009).
68
Id.
69
Id. at 952–53.
70
Id. at 967.
71
Id.
72
See Ben Parfitt, US: Concern builds over new game laws, MCV (July 6, 2010),
http://www.mcvuk.com/news/39887/US-Concern-builds-over-new-game-laws (quoting Take Two’s
Strauss Zelnick as saying, “[i]t’s very, very surprising that the Supreme Court is hearing the case.”).
Strauss Zelnick is the former chairman of Take Two Incentive, a large video game publisher. Dean
Takahashi, Take-Two’s Strauss Zelnick talks about games beyond Grand Theft Auto, GAMEBEAT.COM
(June 17, 2009), http://venturebeat.com/2009/06/17/take-twos-strauss-zelnick-talks-about-gamesbeyond-grand-theft-auto/. Take Two publishes the popular Grand Theft Auto Series. Id.
73
During the oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Kagan cited Postal 2 as the
only clearly identifiable example of the type of video game California’s law seeks to ban, “but
presumably the statute applies to more than one video game.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–12,
Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448) (argued Nov. 2, 2010).
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grounds.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE OBSCENITY STANDARD
The First Amendment ensures that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech.” 74 Although the definition of speech under the
Constitution is continually expanding, there are recognized freedoms that fall
within this category. These include the freedom to speak, the freedom to read, the
freedom to write, and freedom of thought. 75 Within all of these protected
freedoms is the freedom of expression. In protecting this right, the Court has
stated, “the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content.” 76
In evaluating whether video games are expressive and therefore protected,
many of the circuit and district courts have concluded that video games fulfill the
requirements for expression. 77 When determining whether certain conduct is
expressive for the purpose of First Amendment protection, the court must consider
“whether an intent to convey a particularized message is present, and whether the
likelihood is great that the message would be understood by those who viewed
it.” 78 Because video games contain elements of “original artwork, graphics, music,
storylines and characters similar to movies and television shows,” courts have
ruled that they are forms of expression. This qualifies them as deserving of First
Amendment protection. 79
Not all categories of expression, however, are protected by the First
Amendment, 80 such as the category of obscenity. 81 The U.S. Supreme Court first
held that obscenity was not within the category of constitutionally protected speech
in Roth v. United States. 82 In Roth, the defendant was found to be in violation of
California’s obscenity statute for disseminating obscene advertisements through
the mail. 83 Roth challenged the statute as unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court
upheld the ruling on the basis that obscenity is not protected by the First

74
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). As such, when
states challenge the First Amendment, they also often include a challenge to the Fourteenth Amendment
based on the doctrine of incorporation.
75
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,
193 (1952).
76
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002).
77
See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n v. Henry, 2007 WL 2743097, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2007);
Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 651 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Video Software
Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1184 (W.D. Wash. 2004). But see James v. Meow
Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 696 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that an extension of the “First Amendment
protection to video games certainly presents some thorny issues”).
78
Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 2003).
79
Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 651.
80
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
81
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 480 (1957) (declaring that “this Court has always assumed
that obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press.”).
82
Id. at 485.
83
Id. at 480.
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Amendment right to free speech. 84 While the Court distinguished obscenity from
sex, it defined obscene materials as those which, “deal[] with sex in a manner
appealing to the prurient interest.” 85 For example, portrayals of sex in art and
literature are not inherently obscene, rather, it is the effect that certain sexual
materials incite lustful thoughts that makes them obscene. 86
Recently, obscenity has been defined as limited to “[o]nly ‘works which
depict or describe sexual conduct’ are considered obscene and therefore
unprotected.” 87 The standard for obscenity was established by the Supreme Court
in the case of Miller v. California. 88 In Miller, the Court reviewed the
constitutionality of a California statute that criminalized the dissemination of
sexually explicit materials. 89 The Court recalled the established definition of
obscenity as “material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient
interest.” 90 Because obscenity is unprotected by the First Amendment, the Court
explained that states can regulate such materials provided that the law is limited to
“works, which taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole,
do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” 91 The Court
then proceeded to establish the three part test for obscenity, which requires
determining:
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards”
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 92

The Court, however, qualified its holding by acknowledging the “inherent dangers
of undertaking to regulate any form of expression.” 93
While the Supreme Court has applied the First Amendment protections to all
persons equally, it has recognized the need to expand the definition of obscenity
with respect to minors. 94 In Ginsberg v. New York, the Supreme Court upheld a
New York statute that regulated the sale of sexual materials to minors, despite the
finding that the materials were not obscene as to adults. 95 The Court explained
that, “material which is protected for distribution to adults is not necessarily
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Id. at 493.
Id. at 487.
Id.
Software Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1185 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 20 n.2 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 487).
Id. at 24.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 23.
See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
Id. at 635, 637.
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constitutionally protected from restriction upon its dissemination to children.” 96
Furthermore, “the concept of obscenity or of unprotected matter may vary
according to the group to whom the questionable material is directed or from
whom it is quarantined.” 97 Thus, the Court established a separate standard of
obscenity with respect to minors and, therefore, New York’s law did not violate
the constitutionally protected freedoms of such minors. 98
More recently, in the context of video games, many states have repeatedly
attempted to rely on the Court’s ruling in Ginsberg to support the proposed
extension of obscenity with respect to minors to include violent content. 99
Because, however, the definition of obscenity does not include violence, this
strategy has not been successful. District and circuit courts continue to reinforce
the distinction between the unprotected category of obscenity and the
constitutionally protected category of violence. 100
Regulations on content protected by the First Amendment are typically held
to a high standard of review. The first step in reviewing laws regulating free
speech is determining whether the regulation is content-based or content-neutral.
Content-based regulations attempt to limit the actual message of the “speech,”
while content-neutral regulations refer to statutes that are intended to protect the
public in general, but incidentally impact speech. 101 The statutes regulating the
distribution of violent video games are content-based regulations because they are
restricting the games based on their content. Content-based regulations are
presumptively invalid and therefore require application of the strict scrutiny
standard of review. 102
In order for a law to be upheld under strict scrutiny review, it must be
“narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest.” 103
Additionally, this analysis requires a determination of whether there is a less
restrictive alternative that would serve the same government interest. 104 With
respect to the requirement of having a compelling state interest, the government
must prove that “the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the
regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.” 105
Courts have repeatedly found that statutes regulating the sale of violent video
games do not survive the high standard of strict scrutiny review, either on the basis

96
Id. at 636 (quoting William B. Lockhart & Robert C. McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The
Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 85 (1960)).
97
Id.
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Id. at 638.
99
These states include Michigan, Washington, Louisiana, Indiana, and Missouri.
100
See Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County, 329 F. 3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 2003);
Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 575–76 (7th Cir. 2001); Video Software
Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1185 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
101
See R.A.V. v. City of Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385–86 (1992). Example of a content-based
regulation as opposed to a content-neutral regulation is that an ordinance banning fires is contentneutral while an ordinance banning burning the flag is content-based. Id. at 385.
102
Id. at 382.
103
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
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Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994).
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that the alleged governmental interest is not valid or that, despite the existence of a
compelling interest, there are less restrictive alternatives available. 106
IV. ANALYSIS OF OTHER CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS
California’s attempted ban on the sale of violent video games is just one in a
long line of attempts by state and local governments to regulate the distribution of
violent video games to minors. 107 In the last decade alone, there have been twelve
cases brought before the federal courts to decide the constitutionality of state and
local laws prohibiting the distribution of violent video games to minors. 108
Despite the variation in the language of the enacted statutes, the circuit and district
courts have unanimously held that these regulations on the distribution of certain
video games based on their violent content is unconstitutional under a strict
scrutiny standard of review.
Starting in 2000, the City of Indianapolis enacted an ordinance that limited
the access of minors to violent video game content. 109 The ordinance specifically
forbade any operator of five or more video-game machines in one place, namely
arcade operators, from allowing an unaccompanied minor to use a machine that
would be “harmful to minors.” 110 The term “harmful to minors” was defined as
meaning that which, “appeals to minors’ morbid interest in violence or minors’
prurient interest in sex, is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult
community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for persons under
the age of eighteen,” and contains, “graphic violence” or “strong sexual
content.” 111 The ordinance also required that such operators post appropriate
warning signs and separate, by partition, “harmful” machines from other machines
at that location. 112 This includes concealing the viewing areas from persons on the
other side of the partition. 113 Lastly, the ordinance included provisions addressing
the appropriate punishment for violations of the legislation, which included
monetary penalties, and the revocation or suspension of the right to operate such
machines. 114
In drafting this legislation, the City of Indianapolis cited studies that showed
young people who played violent video games “display[ed] higher levels of
hostility and anxiety, and that children who play violent video games repeatedly

106

See infra Part IV.
See generally Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County, 329 F. 3d 954, 958 (8th
Cir. 2003); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 2001); Entm’t
Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 653 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Video Software Dealers
Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1185 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
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See infra Part IV in its entirety.
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See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 573.
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Id.
111
Id. The ordinance further defined “graphic violence” as that representing, “realistic serious
injury to a human or human-like being where such serious injury includes amputation, decapitation,
dismemberment, bloodshed, mutilation, maiming or disfiguration.” Id.
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are conditioned to overcome built-in resistance to acting out violently in response
to these emotions.” 115 In addition, these studies showed that children often play
out violent scenes they view in video games and develop motor skills required to
carry out violent fantasies. 116
The ordinance, however, never went into effect since video game
manufacturers and their trade association brought suit to enjoin enforcement of the
law as a violation of the First Amendment. 117 The district court, however, found
that the ordinance did not violate the plaintiff manufacturer’s constitutional rights,
and on appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision finding that the ordinance
significantly restricts expression without any compelling justification. 118 Upon
rendering its decision, the Seventh Circuit stated that, “[v]iolence and obscenity
are distinct categories of objectionable depiction.” 119 The importance of this
distinction is that obscene materials are unprotected by the First Amendment
because they are offensive, as opposed to the violent content in the regulated video
games, which supposedly engenders harm on young children. 120 The court admits
that “[p]rotecting people from violence is at least as hallowed a role for
government as protecting people from graphic imagery”; however, “[t]o shield
children right up to the age of 18 from exposure to violent descriptions and images
would not only be quixotic, but deforming.” 121 In his opinion, Justice Posner
acknowledges that video games may be different than other media because of their
interactivity, but ultimately this distinction is erroneous since “all literature . . . is
interactive; the better it is, the more interactive.” 122 As such, the Seventh Circuit
determined that the benefits of the Indianapolis ordinance were, at best, conjectural
and therefore did not justify the city’s regulation on violent video games. 123 The
city tried to appeal the decision by writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, but this petition was subsequently denied. 124
Less than two years later, the Interactive Digital Software Association, along
with other video game publishers and retailers, brought suit to enjoin the
enforcement of St. Louis County Ordinance No. 20,193, which made it “unlawful
for any person knowingly to sell, rent, or make available, graphically violent video
games to minors, or to ‘permit the free play of’ graphically violent video games by
115
Exec. Order No. 1, Prohibition of Violent Video Games With Violent Content From City Rightsof-Way And Public Property, CONSOLIDATED CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS AND MARION COUNTY (Mar. 13,
2000), http://www.indygov.org/eGov/City/OCC/Documents/EO_1_2000.pdf.
116
Id.
117
Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 573.
118
Id. at 579.
119
Id. at 574.
120
Id. at 575.
121
Id. at 575, 577.
122
Id. at 577.
123
Id. at 581. In addition, the court recognized the “irreparable harm” such an ordinance would
have on the plaintiff manufacturers because of the cost of altering their facilities and the loss of
revenue. Id. In accordance with this order, the city was ordered to pay the arcade industry $318,000 for
attorney’s fees. Essential Facts: About Video Games and Court Rulings, ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE
ASSOCIATION, 9, http://www.theesa.com/facts/pdfs/EFCourtsandRulings2010.pdf (last visited Feb. 13,
2011).
124
Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 573.
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minors, without a parent or guardian’s consent.” 125 The plaintiff companies
argued that the ordinance was unconstitutional based on its violation of the First
Amendment, however, the district court rejected this argument by concluding that,
“video games were not a protected form of speech under the First Amendment.” 126
The plaintiff companies appealed the decision to the Eighth Circuit, 127
which reversed the district court’s findings after applying a strict scrutiny review to
the St. Louis County ordinance. 128 In its analysis, the Eighth Circuit first
addressed the district court’s error in categorizing video games as a new medium
that falls outside the protections of the First Amendment. 129 The court stated that:
If the first amendment is versatile enough to “shield [the] painting of Jackson
Pollock, 130 music of Arnold Schoenberg, 131 or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis
Carroll,” 132 we see no reason why the pictures, graphic design, concept art, sounds,
music, stories, and narrative present in video games are not entitled to similar
protection. 133

In continuing its discussion that video games are validly protected by the First
Amendment, the Eighth Circuit also stated that the fact that video games are
interactive does not make them any less protected. 134 To support this conclusion,
the Eight Circuit drew on the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Kendrick, finding that
“literature is most successful when it ‘draws the reader into the story, makes him
identify with the characters, invites him to judge them and quarrel with them, to
experience their joys and sufferings as the reader’s own.’” 135
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Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County, 329 F. 3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2003).
Id.
127
Id. It is significant to note that on appeal, the plaintiffs did not challenge the ordinance’s
restrictions on minors’ access to video games with strong sexual content. Id.
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Id. at 960.
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Id. at 957 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557,
569 (1995)).
130
Jackson Pollock was an American painter, best known for his work in the style of Abstract
Expressionism, an art form characterized by free-associative gestures, often called “action painting.”
See Francis Valentine O’Connor, Jackson Pollock Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, 1, http://www.
biography.com/articles/Jackson-Pollock-9443818?part=0 (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). His most famous
works were the product of the “pouring” technique, which was the process of pouring or dripping paint
onto a canvas. Id. at 2. The intensity of this technique earned him the nickname “Jack the Dripper” by
Time magazine. Id. A catalogue of Jackson Pollock’s works can be viewed online. See Jackson
Pollock, THE ARTCHIVE, http://www.artchive.com/artchive/P/pollock.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).
131
Arnold Schoenberg was a musical composer who was born in Vienna and was most recognized
for his creation of a new method of composition, known as atonality. Biography of Arnold Schoenberg,
CLASSICCAT.NET, http://www.classiccat.net/schonberg_a/biography.php (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
His compositions are available on iTunes.
132
“Jabberwocky” is a poem by Lewis Carroll that was incorporated into Carroll’s novel, Through
the Looking Glass. See Linda Sue Grimes, Lewis Carroll’s ‘Jabberwocky’: Sense and Nonsense,
SUITE101 (April 13, 2007), http://lindasuegrimes.suite101.com/lewis-carrolls-jabberwocky-a18615.
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After determining that video games are a protected media under the First
Amendment, the Eighth Circuit went on to state that the appropriate level of
review for the ordinance was that of strict scrutiny since the proposed regulation
was content-based. 136 Furthermore, the circuit court rejected St. Louis County’s
argument that graphic violence in video games was a part of the category of
obscenity with respect to minors and therefore entitled to less constitutional
protection. 137
Content-based regulations of speech must be justified by a compelling state
interest and the law must be narrowly tailored to advance this interest. 138 In
applying this standard, the Eighth Circuit assessed the two compelling state
interests put forth by St. Louis County: (1) that it has an interest in protecting the
“psychological well-being of minors,” and (2) that it has an interest in “assisting
parents to be the guardians of their children’s well-being.” 139
With respect to the county’s first interest, the Eighth Circuit found that while
protecting the well-being of minors was a compelling state interest in the
“abstract,” there must be solid proof that such an interest is threatened. 140
Essentially, the county “must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not
merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a
direct and material way.” 141 Although the county presented evidence of a study
that indicated playing violent video games frequently leads to aggressive thoughts
and behavior, the Eighth Circuit determined that this was not conclusive empirical
evidence that violent video games cause psychological harm to minors. 142 In the
absence of such substantial evidence, the circuit court concluded that the county’s
regulation on the sale and rental of violent video games could not be justified. 143
In analyzing the county’s second compelling interest, the Eighth Circuit
agreed that a parent’s authority to direct the rearing of their children is a
fundamental part of society; however, the real issue was whether it was
constitutionally permissible for First Amendment rights to be limited in order to
aid such parental authority. 144
In support of this compelling state interest the county cited to Ginsberg, in
which the Supreme Court found that the State of New York could regulate the sale
of obscene material to minors. 145 Based on its finding that such material was
considered obscene with respect to minors, the Supreme Court applied the rational
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Id. “Simply put, depictions of violence cannot fall within the legal definition of obscenity for
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basis level of review to the New York regulation. 146 The Eighth Circuit
distinguished Ginsberg from the county ordinance based on the determination that
Ginsberg involved speech that was not protected by the First Amendment, whereas
the violent video games in the present case were considered protected. 147 As such,
the Eighth Circuit refused to apply the “less exacting” standard of the rational basis
test in evaluating the constitutionality of the St. Louis ordinance. 148 Furthermore,
the Eighth Circuit stated that in neither Ginsberg, nor any other case for that
matter, did the Supreme Court allow the government’s interest in helping parents
protect their children’s well-being justify the regulation of what minors read and
watch. 149
Based on this interpretation of Ginsberg, the Eighth Circuit clarified its
holding by saying, “[w]e do not mean to denigrate the government’s role in
supporting parents, or the right of parents to control their children’s exposure to
graphically violent materials. We merely hold that the government cannot silence
protected speech by wrapping itself in the cloak of parental authority.” 150 As such,
the circuit court determined that finding an interest in parental aide compelling
would “invite legislatures to undermine the first amendment rights of minors willynilly under the guise of promoting parental authority.” 151 Therefore, the St. Louis
ordinance regulating the sale of violent video games was deemed
unconstitutional. 152
In 2003, the Washington State Legislature passed a law prohibiting the sale
or rental of any violent video games that depicted harm to a human form that was
recognizable as a law enforcement officer. 153 A number of the companies and
associations that create, publish, distribute, sell, or rent video games brought suit in
the district court as plaintiffs to enjoin enforcement of the law based on the
argument that it violated the First Amendment. 154
In its analysis of the constitutionality of the Washington law, the district
court first addressed whether video games were actually protected by the First
Amendment. To make this determination, the court considered “whether an intent
to convey a particularized message is present, and whether the likelihood is great
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.” 155 The district
court acknowledged that early video games probably lacked the requisite
“expressive element”; however, today’s games often involve story lines, original
scores, and complex narratives, which require the player to make choices and gain
146
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experience through play. 156 As such, today’s video games qualify as expression,
and, subsequently speech, which is protected by the First Amendment. 157
The defendants, represented by prosecuting attorney Norm Maleng, 158
argued that despite the expressiveness of video games, they fall into a category of
unprotected speech, namely obscenity. 159 The district court addressed this
argument beginning with an analysis of the Latin root for obscenity, which literally
means “filth.” 160 It also reviewed the recognized legal definition of obscenity
stated by the Supreme Court in Miller, which includes material that is “disgusting
to the senses [and] grossly repugnant to the generally accepted notions of what is
appropriate.” 161 While the district court acknowledged that graphically violent
video games such as Grand Theft Auto: Vice City fall within the general definition
of obscenity, they still do not fit within the legal definition of obscenity. 162 The
legal definition of obscenity is limited to sexual material and is for that reason
unprotected by the First Amendment. 163
The district court also addressed the defendant’s acknowledgement that the
enacted law does not regulate content that is obscene by the legal definition. 164
Nevertheless, the defendants argued that the legal definition of obscenity should be
expanded “to include graphic portrayals of violence.” 165 In rejecting this
argument, the district court cited not only the lack of case law supporting such a
proposition, but also the different effects caused by a ban on sexually explicit
content as opposed to a ban on violent content. The court reasoned that the
“prevention and punishment of lewd speech has very little, if any, impact on the
free expression of ideas . . . The same cannot be said for depictions of violence.” 166
Additionally, the district court distinguished Ginsberg, which the defense
argued had broadened the definition of obscenity with respect to minors to include
violence. 167 In its analysis, the district court recognized the broadening of the
obscenity definition, however, it stated that, “[t]he statute at issue in Ginsberg did
not create an entirely new category of unprotected speech; rather it adjusted the
Roth definition of obscene material to capture that which is of sexual interest to
minors.” 168 As such, nothing less than the full protection of the First Amendment
is applicable to the video games in dispute.
Following its determination that video games are entitled to full protection
156
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by the First Amendment, the district court applied the traditional strict scrutiny
standard of review to the statute. 169 In doing so, the court reviewed the two
compelling interests offered by the State: “(1) ‘to curb hostile and antisocial
behavior in Washington’s youth’ and (2) ‘to foster respect for public law
enforcement.’” 170 The district court agreed that protecting the physical and
psychological well-being of minors is a widely recognized compelling interest. 171
Nevertheless, it determined that the research presented by the State failed to show
that “exposure to video games that ‘trivialize violence against law enforcement
officers’ is likely to lead to actual violence against such officers.” 172
Based on this finding, the court went one step further and reasoned that the
lack of substantial evidence made it impossible to determine that the statute would
have the intended affect on minors. 173 It declared that, “[e]ven if defendants were
able to show a causal connection between violent video games and real-life
aggression in minors, the record does not support the finding that the Act is likely
to curb such aggression in a direct and material way.” 174
The district court finished its strict scrutiny analysis with the conclusion that,
even if the State had a compelling state interest in preventing violence and
aggression in minors towards law enforcement officers, it is not the least restrictive
alternative to achieving that end since it “impact[s] more constitutionally protected
speech than is necessary . . . .” 175
The district court did, however, contemplate whether a state could ever enact
a constitutional law banning the distribution of video games to minors. It
answered “‘probably yes’ if the games contain sexually explicit images . . . and
‘maybe’ if the games contain violent images, such as torture and bondage, that
appeal to the prurient interest of minors.” 176 The court also laid out the framework
for future attempts to regulate the sale of video games based on their content by
listing the key considerations for such an inquiry. 177

169
Id. The court laid out its analysis under this standard by stating that the statute “will be upheld
only if defendants can show that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that
it is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Id.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 1186–87.
172
Id. at 1188.
173
Id. at 1189. The court ultimately came to this determination in its finding that the statute was
both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. Id. It reasoned the statute was over-inclusive since it would
not only ban games depicting violence against police officers, but it would also ban games depicting
heroic struggles against corruption and oppression. Id. With respect to the problem of under-inclusion,
the statute has no effect on minors’ access to other generally violent video games because it is limited to
only those games that depict violence against police officers, but fails to encompass those other brutally
violent games that portray violence against other people, often women and child. Id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 1190.
177
See id. These key considerations are as follows:
[D]oes the regulation cover only the type of depraved or extreme acts of violence
that violate community norm and prompted the legislature to act? Does the
regulation prohibit depictions of extreme violence against all innocent victims,
regardless of their viewpoint or status? [A]nd do the social scientific studies
support the legislative findings at issue?
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Finally, the district court addressed the challenge that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague, unlike previous circuit opinions. 178 It determined that
the statute was vague based on the effects it would have on the video game
industry. 179 Not only would overly cautious game store clerks be susceptible to
withholding games from minors that were not covered by the statute, but also that
video game publishers and designers would most likely be more cautious in their
game design in order to ensure their game did not fall under the restrictions of the
statute. 180 As such, the vagueness of the statute rendered it unconstitutional on
these grounds as well. 181
Less than a year after Washington struck down the State’s attempt to regulate
the distribution of violent video games, the United States District Court of the
Northern District of Illinois heard a case brought by the video game industry to
enjoin enforcement of an Illinois law that would regulate the sale and rental of
violent video games to minors. 182 On July 25, 2005, the State of Illinois signed
into law the Illinois Public Act 94-0315, which effectively created two new
criminal statutes: the Violent Video Games Law (“VVGL”) and the Sexually
Explicit Video Games Law (“SEVGL”). 183 The VVGL specifically criminalized
the selling or renting of violent video games to minors including a minor’s use of
self-electronic checkout scanners to purchase such games. 184 It also required that
such violent games be labeled with a two by two-inch sticker stating “18.” 185 The
statute also gave a definition for what constitutes a violent video game, which are
those games that include, “depictions of or simulations of human-on-human
violence in which the player kills or otherwise causes serious physical harm to
another human.” 186 Violations of the VVGL incurred fines between $500 and
$1,000. 187
The very same day the new laws were passed, various video game
organizations including the VSDA and the ESA brought suit to enjoin enforcement
of the laws on the grounds that the statutes violated their First Amendment rights
to free speech. 188
Prior to the trial, the district court held an evidentiary hearing to consider the

Id.
178

See id. at 1190.
Id. at 1191.
180
Id.
181
Id. Based on this ruling, the district court judge ordered the state of Washington to pay the
plaintiffs $344,000 for attorney’s fees. See Essential Facts: About Video Games and Court Rulings,
supra note 123, at 8.
182
Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1055, 1058 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
183
Id. at 1057. The SEVGL included these same requirements. Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Violent Video Games Law, Pub. Act 94-315, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12A-10(e) (2005),
invalidated by Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1051. The statute further defined “serious physical
harm” as “depictions of death, dismemberment, amputation, decapitation, maiming, disfigurement,
mutilation of body parts, or rape.” Id.
187
Id.
188
Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1058.
179
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effect of violent video games on younger persons. Specifically, the court focused
on two main issues: (1) “whether minors who play violent video games experience
an increase in aggressive thoughts, aggressive affect, and aggressive behavior,”
and (2) “whether minors who play such games experience a decline in brain
activity in the region of the brain that controls behavior.” 189
With respect to the first issue, the court conducted an in depth review of the
research presented by the State, which was mainly comprised of testimony and
studies by Dr. Craig Anderson. 190 Based on this evidence, the court determined
that, at best, Dr. Anderson’s research was inconclusive since there was nothing in
his research to “establish a solid causal link between violent video game exposure
and aggressive thinking and behavior.” 191 Furthermore, Dr. Anderson failed to
eliminate the most obvious alternative explanation for the results of his findings,
which is that “aggressive individuals may themselves be attracted to violent video
games.” 192 The court also criticized the absence of any evidence in Dr.
Anderson’s studies that distinguished between the effect of violent video games
and the effect of other violent media, such as movies or television. 193 Most
notably, the district court stated that, “[e]ven if one were to accept the proposition
that playing violent video games increases aggressive thoughts or behavior, there is
no evidence that this effect is at all significant.” 194
In addressing the second issue regarding the effect of violent video games on
brain activity, the court compared the conflicting testimonies of the defendant’s
expert, Dr. William Kronenberger and plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Howard Nusbaum. 195
Again, the court conducted an in depth review in the opinion of both doctors’
research and testimony, ultimately siding with Dr. Nusbaum and concluding that
there was no basis for the determination that “minors who play violent video
games are more likely to ‘[e]xperience a reduction of activity in the frontal lobes of
the brain which is responsible for controlling behavior.’” 196
After finding the State’s concern with the effect of violent video games on
minors to be without support, the district court turned to the issue regarding the
constitutionality of the VVGL. 197 Based on the determination that the VVGL is a

189

Id. at 1058–59.
Id. at 1059–62. Dr. Anderson is a psychologist and professor at Iowa State University. Id. at
1059. Dr. Anderson’s research revealed that he had conducted a series of studies that involved one set
of college students playing a violent video game and another group playing a non-violent video game,
during which time the students would either administer a noise blast signaling their victory, or would
hear noise blasts signaling the victory of a pretend competitor. See Craig A. Anderson et al., Violent
Video Games: Specific Effects of Violent Content on Aggressive Thoughts and Behavior, 36 ADVANCES
IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 225–28 (2004).
191
Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1063.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 1062–66. Dr. William Kronenberger is a clinical psychologist at the Indiana University
School of Medicine who primarily works with and studies children and adolescents with behavioral
disorders. Id. at 1063. Dr. Howard Nusbaum is a cognitive psychologist at the University of Chicago.
Id. at 1066.
196
Id. at 1067 (quoting the trial transcript at 356) (internal quotation marks omitted).
197
See id. at 1071.
190
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content-based regulation, the court applied the strict scrutiny standard of review. 198
The State claimed five interests that were promoted by the VVGL, which included:
(1) “preventing violent, aggressive, and asocial behavior,” (2) “preventing
psychological and neurological harm to minors,” (3) “eliminating societal factors
that may inhibit the physiological and neurological development of its youth,” (4)
facilitating the maturation of Illinois’ children into law abiding, productive adults,”
and (5) “assisting parents in protecting their children from such games.” 199 While
the district court agreed that protecting children from violence and assisting
parents were compelling state interests, it concluded that the VVGL did not meet
the requirements under Brandenburg. 200 Specifically, it found there was a lack of
“substantial evidence showing that playing violent video games causes minors to
have aggressive feelings or engage in aggressive behavior.” 201
In response to the State’s contention that the VVGL serves the compelling
interest in preventing psychological harm to minors, the district court relied on the
notion that our society is built on the practice of free thinking. 202 The court quoted
Justice Jackson in stating:
“The priceless heritage of our society is the unrestricted constitutional right of each
member to think as he will. Thought control is a copyright of totalitarianism, and
we have no claim to it. It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen
from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government from
falling into error.” These concerns apply to minors just as they apply to adults. 203

Thus, the district court reasoned that even if there was a compelling state interest
in protecting the minds of children, the state cannot premise the regulation of free
speech on how it may affect the listener, regardless of the listener’s age. 204
The district court also rejected the State’s argument that the Ginsberg
holding permits the state to regulate violent video games with respect to minors. 205
It distinguished Ginsberg on the same grounds as Kendrick, in that Ginsberg
allowed the State of New York to regulate obscene materials, however, it did not
give the State the authority to regulate speech that was “harmful to minors.” 206 As
such, the VVGL could not be validated on the basis of the Ginsberg holding. 207

198

Id. at 1072.
Id.
200
Id. The court recognized that speech protected by the First Amendment may still be regulated
based on its content if it meets the requirements of Brandenburg. The speech must be “directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action, and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Id. at
1073 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)). The court added, “the ‘glacial process of
personality development’ that video games allegedly affect ‘is far from the temporal imminent that we
have required to satisfy the Brandenburg test.’” Id. at 1074 (quoting James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300
F. 3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
201
Id. at 1074.
202
Id. at 1074–75.
203
Id. (quoting Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442–43 (1950)).
204
Id.
205
Id. at 1075–76
206
Id. at 1076.
207
Id. The district court also addressed the argument that the VVGL was unconstitutionally vague.
Id. Although it agreed that the meaning of certain terminology would be clear in many instances, in the
199
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Lastly, the court briefly addressed the VVGL and SEVGL’s requirement that
certain violent and sexually explicit video games be labeled with a sticker that read
“18.” 208 The court rejected the State’s argument that the lower “commercial
speech” standard should be applied and, 209 instead, determined that the labeling
requirement was compelled speech subject to the higher strict scrutiny standard
since such a label contains no factual information about the game. 210
Based on its overall findings and the ultimate conclusion that the statutes
were unconstitutional, the district court granted the plaintiffs a permanent
injunction barring enforcement of both the VVGL and SEVGL. 211
On September 14, 2005, Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm signed into
law an act that would regulate the distribution of video games defined as sexually
explicit or ultra-violent explicit video games to persons under the age of
seventeen. 212 The law defines an “ultra-violent explicit video game” as one that
“continually and repetitively depicts extreme and loathsome violence.” 213 The law
also defines “extreme and loathsome violence” as meaning “real or simulated
graphic depictions of physical injuries or physical violence against parties who
realistically appear to be human beings . . . .” 214
A number of creators, publishers and video game distributors, as plaintiffs,
brought suit in federal district court to enjoin the enforcement of the law. 215 In
filing their complaint, the plaintiffs stated the law was invalid since it was in
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and, therefore,
unconstitutional. 216 After being granted a temporary injunction, the plaintiffs
moved for summary judgment on their claims, which the district court ultimately
granted. 217
In the first part of its analysis, the district court focused on the issue of
whether video games were a protected form of expression under the First
Amendment. 218 It determined that the original artwork, music, storylines, and

context of the video game industry, the statute would leave retailers and game publishers guessing as to
what types of games are considered violent for the purposes of the statute. Id. at 1077. Thus, the
statute also fails for its unconstitutional vagueness. Id.
208
Id. at 1081.
209
“Commercial speech” is defined as disclosures that are “purely factual and uncontroversial” and
“intended to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception.” Id. at 1081 (quoting
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651–52 (1985)). The
appropriate level of review for such speech is the lower level rational basis test. Id.
210
Id. at 1081–82.
211
Id. The State of Illinois later appealed the district court’s ruling, but only with respect to the
SEVGL. See Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the
State was ordered to pay the plaintiffs $510,000 for attorney’s fees. See Essential Facts: About Video
Games and Court Rulings, supra note 123, at 7.
212
Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649 (E.D. Mich. 2006). See also
2005 Mich. Pub. Acts 108.
213
2005 Mich. Pub. Acts 108, part II.
214
Id.
215
Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 649.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id. at 650.
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characters in video games were not unlike those in movie and television shows,
which are both protected by the First Amendment. 219 In addition, the district court
rejected the defendants’ argument that video games were a distinct category of
media based on its interactive functionality. 220 The court reasoned that while
video games are an ever expanding technology, with advancements that allow
players to interact and control the fate of their characters more than ever before,
“[i]t would be impossible to separate the functional aspects of a video game from
the expressive, inasmuch as they are so closely intertwined and dependant on each
other in creating the virtual experience.” 221 As such, video games are considered
to contain expressive free speech that is protected by the First Amendment. 222
Next, the district court applied the strict scrutiny level of review to the law,
since it was seeking to infringe First Amendment rights of free speech. 223 In doing
so, it quickly dismissed the defendants’ argument that the appropriate approach
was that in Ginsberg, relying on the lack of precedent to support such an
application. 224 In proceeding with its strict scrutiny review, the district court found
that even if the law had satisfied the requirements in Brandenburg, “the State has
failed to support its claims by ‘substantial evidence.’” 225 The district court
reviewed, somewhat in depth, the evidence presented by the defendants which
included studies conducted by psychologists Dr. Craig Anderson and Dr. William
Kronenberg. 226 Dr. Anderson’s research was based on a “general aggression
model” 227 that suggested playing violent video games creates “automatized”
The district court, however, was
aggressive thoughts and behaviors. 228
unconvinced by his studies finding they did not provide any “evidence that the
relationship between violent video games and aggressive behavior exists.” 229 Nor
did they prove that “video games have ever caused anyone to commit a violent act,
as opposed to feeling aggressive, or have caused the average level of violence to
increase anywhere.” 230
The district court was even less impressed with Dr. William Kronenberg’s

219

Id. at 651.
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id. at 651–52. As previously discussed, strict scrutiny requires that the State prove the law
advances a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly tailored to advance such interest. Id. Before
getting to its analysis, the court briefly addressed the plaintiffs’ argument that the law fails the three part
test for radical speech outlined in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Id. at 652. It agreed that
under the Brandenburg analysis, the law failed the first prong, which states that “free speech may be
restricted if it ‘is directed to inciting or producing the imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce action’” Id. (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447). As such, there was no need to analyze
the two other prongs of the test, however, the district court continued to apply the standard strict
scrutiny review later in its opinion. Id.
224
Id.
225
Id. at 652–53.
226
Id. at 653.
227
See Anderson, supra note 190, at 202–04.
228
Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 653.
229
Id.
230
Id. (quoting Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 578–69 (7th Cir. 2001)).
220
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work, which failed to not only “provide concrete evidence that there is a
connection between violent media and aggressive behavior, [but] it also fail[ed] to
distinguish between video games and other forms of media.” 231
After finding the defendants’ evidence less than compelling to support their
position, the district court further determined that the law does not advance the
stated interest of the legislature. 232 The State’s claimed interest is in protecting the
physical and psychological well-being of minors as well as preventing violent and
antisocial behavior. 233 According to the district court, however, the law fails to
achieve this end since it “fails to regulate other comparable forms of violent media
from minors.” 234 The most adequate demonstration of this point is that the State
cannot achieve its stated interest when the law prevents a minor from purchasing
games such as Resident Evil 4 or Doom 3, but still allows them to buy Resident
Evil and Doom movies. 235
The district court completed the last part of the strict scrutiny analysis by
stating that the law is not the least restrictive alternative to achieve its interests. 236
Other reasonable alternatives proffered by the court included an advertising
campaign to better educate parents about the rating systems currently in place by
the ESRB and further educate parents about what to look for when purchasing
games for their children. 237 As such, the district court ruled the proposed
regulation of violent video games is unconstitutional since it failed to pass the
strict scrutiny test required of such laws. 238
The district court also determined that the proposed regulation was
unconstitutionally vague by looking at the effect the law would most likely have
on retailers and game designers. 239 It found that the definitions in the law would
cause retailers to respond with self-censoring and limit access to certain titles for
fear of severe civil and criminal liabilities. 240 Furthermore, video game designers
would be careful to create games that were well beyond the reach of the law in
order to avoid any risk of penalties. 241
Only a few months after the Granholm decision came down, the governor of
Louisiana signed an act into law for the purpose of prohibiting the distribution of

231
Id. The district court also dismissed the joint statement of the American Medical Association,
the American Pediatric Association and the American Psychological Association, which stated that
violent video games have a “negative impact” on minors. Id. at 653.
232
Id. at 654.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id. at 655.
239
Id. In order to avoid vagueness, “[t]he Constitution requires that statutes be set forth with
‘sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited.’” Id. (quoting
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
240
Id. at 656.
241
Id. Based on its ruling, the district court judge ordered the State of Michigan to pay the
plaintiffs $182,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs for the resulting litigation. See Essential Facts: About
Video Games and Court Rulings, supra note 123, at 6.
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video games “that appeal to a minor’s morbid interest in violence.” 242 This
immediately prompted both the ESA and the EMA to bring an action for a
preliminary injunction in the district court of Louisiana. 243 The two associations
alleged that the law violated both the First and Fourteenth Amendments and was,
therefore, unconstitutional. 244
The enacted statute criminalized the sale or rental of video games meeting a
certain criteria to anyone under the age of eighteen. 245 These special criteria
included games that depict “violence in a manner patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the adult community with respect to what is suitable for minors.” 246
The penalties for violating this law includes a fine of no less than one hundred
dollars or imprisonment for no more than one year. 247
The district court began its analysis with the determination of whether video
games are considered speech or conduct with respect to the First Amendment. 248
Relying on a series of previous district and circuit opinions, 249 the Louisiana
Middle District Court found that video games are considered speech, based on
their expressiveness. 250 It also added that the fact that such expression includes
depictions of violence does not make it any less entitled to full constitutional
protection. 251
Finding that the violent video games were deserving of full constitutional
protection, the district court stated the appropriate level of review was strict
scrutiny. 252 Louisiana argued that the statute was enacted for two compelling state
interests, which included preventing both “physical” and “psychological” harm to
minors. 253 The district court summarized these interests generally as “curbing
violent behavior.” 254 While the court acknowledged the importance of such an
interest, it determined that regulation of constitutionally protected expression
requires a satisfaction of the Brandenburg test. 255 “Under Brandenburg, the

242
Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823, 825 (M.D. La. 2006); see also LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 91:14 (2008), repealed by 2008 La. Acts 220.
243
Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 825.
244
Id.
245
Id.
246
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91:14(A)(2) (2008), repealed by 2008 La. Acts 220.
247
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91:14(C) (2008), repealed by 2008 La. Acts 220.
248
Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 829.
249
See generally Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 650–51 (E.D. Mich.
2006); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1184–85 (W.D. Wash. 2004);
Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
250
Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 829–30.
251
Id. The district court also followed precedent in finding that the interactive aspect of video
games does not distinguish it from other media for the purposes of First Amendment protection. Id. at
830.
252
Id. The district court broke down the strict scrutiny standard into three distinctive parts: “(1)
articulate a compelling state interest; (2) prove that the Statute actually serves that interest and is
‘necessary’ to do so; and (3) show that the Statute is narrowly tailored and a material advancement of
that interest.” Id. at 831.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
Id.
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government must prove that the targeted expression, ‘is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.’” 256 Because the proposed regulation of violent video games was based on
the Louisiana legislature’s mere prediction that playing such games would tend to
“encourage undesired behavior,” the court found that the State failed to satisfy the
Brandenburg requirements. 257
The district court also agreed with the plaintiffs’ assertion that protecting
minors from “psychological harm” is not a valid stated interest, as it “amounts to
nothing more than ‘impermissible thought control.’” 258 The court drew on support
from the Supreme Court for this determination noting that, “First Amendment
freedoms are most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to
justify its laws for that impermissible end.” 259 As such, the district court found the
State’s proffered interest in preventing psychological harm was not compelling
since a state “may not restrict video game expression merely because it dislikes the
way that expression shapes an individual’s thoughts and attitudes.” 260 The court
also dismissed the State’s presented scientific evidence as sparse, unreliable and
ultimately inadequate to constitute the requisite “substantial evidence” for showing
a compelling state interest under the strict scrutiny standard. 261
In the second section of its strict scrutiny analysis, the court dismissed
Louisiana’s arguments that the law was both narrowly tailored and the least
restrictive alternative for protecting minors from harm. 262 The court explained that
banning violent video games would only shield minors from a “tiny fraction” of
violent media since minors would still be able to legally buy the movies or books
based on those same banned video games. 263 Additionally, the court pointed out
that there are less restrictive alternatives already available to achieve the State’s
goals, such as educating people about the ESRB rating system and promoting the
use and development of parental controls. 264 Based on these findings, the district
court ruled that the video game developers had proven there was a likelihood of
success on their constitutional claims. 265
The district court also discussed the unconstitutional vagueness of the statute
declaring that even if the statute is “aimed at protecting minors, it still must be

256

Id. (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)) (emphasis added).
See id. Specifically, the court stated that “the government may not punish speakers based solely
on a prediction of suspicion that their words will tend, in the aggregate, to encourage undesired
behaviors.” Id.
258
Id.
259
Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002)).
260
Id. at 832.
261
Id. at 832–33. Furthermore, the court found that even if the State were allowed more time to
gather evidence to support its supposed interest, it is unlikely that they “will be able to establish that any
video games are directed towards inciting imminent lawless action or that they are likely to cause such
an action.” Id.
262
Id. at 833.
263
Id.
264
Id. The court noted such alternatives would allow each individual household to decide “which
games their children can play.” Id.
265
Id.
257
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clearly drawn with standards that are reasonably precise.” 266 After reviewing the
language of the statute, the court determined that the lack of definitions for key
terms such as “minor’s morbid interest in violence” and “patently offensive to
prevailing standards in the adult community” was detrimental. 267 The court also
drew on precedent in other cases where similarly worded statutes were also struck
down based on a finding of unconstitutional vagueness. 268
Thus, the district court concluded that enforcement of the Louisiana statute
would cause “irreparable harm” not only to the plaintiffs, but the public as well
because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 269 Three months later,
Judge Brady issued an order directly from the bench that the preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the law be made permanent. 270 Judge Brady cited the
reasons for his decision as those previously elaborated by the district court in its
ruling on the preliminary injunction. 271
More recently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of a
permanent injunction against the enforcement of a Minnesota statute that sought to
restrict the distribution of video games based on the ESRB rating. 272 On May 31,
2006, the Minnesota Restricted Video Games Act was signed into law prohibiting
the sale or rental of a video game that had earned an ESRB rating of either AO or
M. 273 Violations of the law would incur a penalty of no more than $25. 274 In
addition, the statute required that all video game retailers post a sign advising
minors of the aforementioned statute. 275
In response to the enacted legislation, the ESA and EMA brought suit in the
federal district court seeking a permanent injunction, which was subsequently
granted based on the finding that the violent video games in question were
protected speech under the First Amendment. 276
In a brief opinion, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s
determination that violent video games are protected free speech and as such can
only be regulated if there is a finding that the statute serves a compelling state
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Id. at 835.
Id.
268
Id. at 835–36; see also Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 427 F. Supp. 2d, 646, 655–56
(E.D. Mich. 2006) (finding the “lack of precision” in the statute’s definitions to be unconstitutionally
vague); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 690 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding the lack
of “narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standard[s]” in a statute prohibiting the sale and rental of
violent video games to minors unconstitutionally vague).
269
Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 836–37. A showing of “irreparable harm” is a prerequisite to the
granting of a preliminary injunction. See Plummer v. Am. Institute of Certified Pub. Accountants, 97
F.3d 220, 229 (7th Cir. 1996). As a result, the court ordered the state of Louisiana to pay the plaintiff
video game associations $91,000 for attorneys fees. See Essential Facts: About Video Games and
Court Rulings, supra note 123, at 4.
270
See Essential Facts: About Video Games and Court Rulings, supra note 123, at 3.
271
See id.
272
Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 769 (8th Cir. 2008).
273
Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 325I.06(1)-(2) (2006). See also supra, note 53 (explaining the ESRB
ratings).
274
MINN. STAT. § 325I.06(2) (2006).
275
MINN. STAT. § 325I.06(3) (2006).
276
Swanson, 519 F.3d at 770.
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interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that end. 277 Minnesota offered two
compelling interests: (1) protecting the psychological well-being of minors and (2)
protecting the “moral and ethical development of minors.” 278 The circuit court
agreed that the appointed interests are compelling, much like previous courts;
however, it distinguished itself from prior courts by saying it was not as
“dismissive” in its finding that there was a lack of statistical certainty in
establishing “a causal link between exposure to violent video games and
subsequent behavior.” 279
Although the court took a more lenient view of Minnesota’s empirical
evidence, it did compare the violence in video games to violence depicted in great
literature, such as the Bible. 280 The court found that even though it might be
“risible to compare the violence depicted in the examples offered by the State to
that described in classical literature, such violence has been deemed by our court
worthy of First Amendment protection, and there the matter stands.” 281 As such,
the court relied on Interactive Digital Software Ass’n to affirm the district court’s
findings regarding the State’s failure to meet its burden of proof. 282
As previously observed, every statute that has attempted to regulate the
distribution of video games based on their violent content has been struck down as
unconstitutional across all the circuits and districts. Most courts have expressly
recognized video games as a protected form of expression under the First
Amendment and, additionally, that the Ginsberg standard does not create an
entirely new category of speech unprotected as to minors.
V. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION
As previously stated in Part II, section c, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
signed into law California Civil Code §§1746-1746.5 (the “Act”) on October 7,
2005, effectively imposing a civil penalty on all persons who sell or rent violent
video games to minors. 283
Section 1746 of the California Civil Code defined the meaning of the terms
“minor,” 284 “person,” 285 “video game,” 286 and most importantly, “violent video
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Id. This standard is the strict scrutiny test. Id.
Id. at 771.
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Id. at 772.
280
Id. Specifically the court referenced a passage from Judges 4:21 in which “Heber’s wife []
picked up a tent peg and a hammer and went quietly to [Sisera] while he lay fast asleep, exhausted. She
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Id.
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Id. Based on this determination, the Eighth Circuit refrained from discussing the other issues
brought by the State on appeal including the over and under-inclusiveness of the statue. Id. at 771. The
Attorney General later requested an en banc review of the appellate decision, however, this request was
subsequently denied. See Essential Facts: About Video Games and Court Rulings, supra note 123, at 5.
Accordingly, the state of Minnesota paid the plaintiffs $65,000 for attorney’s fees and expenses. Id.
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See Assemb. B. 1179, ch. 638 (Cal. 2005); Robert H. Wood, Violent Video Games: More Ink
Spilled Than Blood – An Analysis of the 9th Circuit Decision in Video Software Dealers Association v.
Schwarzenegger, 10 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 103, 105 (2009).
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CODE § 1746(a) (West 2011).
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game.” 287 Specifically, the statute under §1746(d)(1) defined a violent video game
as one “in which the range of options available to a player includes killing,
maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human being.” 288
Furthermore, if a game meets these criteria, then it must meet one of two
standards. The first standard has three requirements: that “[a] reasonable person,
considering the game as a whole, would find appeals to a deviant or morbid
interest of minors”; that the game “is patently offensive to prevailing standards in
the community as to what is suitable for minors”; and that such actions “cause[]
the game, as a whole, to lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value
for minors.” 289 The second standard requires that the video game “[e]nable[] the
player to virtually inflict serious injury upon images of human beings or characters
with substantially human characteristics in a manner which is especially heinous,
cruel, or depraved in that it involves torture or serious physical abuse.” 290
This regulation of video game sales prompted quick action from the VSDA
and the ESA to file for a preliminary injunction in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California to stop the law from going into effect. 291
The plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to declaratory relief against the Act
based on the fact that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 292
According to the plaintiffs, the unconstitutionality of the Act was rooted in its
restriction of the freedom of expression as a presumptively invalid content-based
regulation. 293 Both sides then proceeded to file cross-motions for summary
judgment, but the district court ultimately ruled in favor of VSDA and ESA
making the injunction permanent. 294 The district court’s ruling effectively
invalidated the Act based on the finding that the Act failed to pass the test of strict
scrutiny, which is the appropriate level of review for regulations of free speech. 295
The State of California filed a timely appeal to the Ninth Circuit to reverse
the district court’s grant of plaintiff’s summary judgment motion. The main issue
on appeal was whether California’s statute was subject to the standard of strict
scrutiny or, as the petitioners argued, was subject to the “variable obscenity”

285
Under the statute, a “person” is “any natural person, partnership, firm, association, corporation,
limited liability company, or other legal entity.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(b) (West 2011).
286
“Video game” is defined as “any electronic amusement device that utilizes a computer,
microprocessor, or similar electronic circuitry and its own monitor, or is designed to be used with a
television set or a computer monitor, that interacts with the user of the device.” CAL. CIV. CODE §
1746(c) (West 2011).
287
Katherine A. Fallow, Content Legislation and Resulting Litigation – Schwarzenegger v EMA
1023, PRACTICING LAW INST. 357, 361 (2010).
288
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1) (West 2011).
289
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1)(A) (West 2011). These three requirements are based on the
Miller test for obscenity. See supra note 88, at 12. See supra Part III regarding the Miller standard.
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CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1)(B) (West 2011).
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Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 2261546 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6,
2007). The VSDA and the ESA are companies that “create, publish, distribute, sell and/or rent video
games.” Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d, 950, 952 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009).
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Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 953, 955.
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Id. at 955.
294
Wood, supra note 283, at 105.
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Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 955–56.
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approach established in Ginsberg. 296 The second issue was whether the statute’s
requirement of labeling every “violent video game” with a solid white “18”
outlined in black constituted compelled speech under First Amendment
jurisprudence. 297
With respect to the first issue, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case of
Ginsberg in order to determine the appropriate level of review for analyzing the
constitutionality of California’s statute. 298 As previously discussed in the section
on the obscenity standard, the Supreme Court in Ginsberg held that the state could
specifically prohibit the sale of pornographic materials to minors based on the
finding that such materials were obscene and, therefore, not protected by the
freedom of speech under the First Amendment. According to the Court, while the
sexually-explicit materials in question were protected for distribution to adults that
did not necessarily mean that such materials were constitutionally protected from
regulation with respect to minors. 299 As such, the Court reasoned that the “concept
of obscenity . . . may vary according to the group to whom the questionable
material is directed or from whom it is quarantined.” 300 By applying this special
application of the obscenity standard to minors, the Court effectively rendered such
obscene material as undeserving of First Amendment protection, and therefore the
appropriate standard of review was the lower threshold of analysis known as the
rational basis test. 301
In applying the rational basis test, the Ginsberg Court offered two valid state
interests to justify its regulation of obscene materials to minors: “(1) that
‘constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents’ claim to
authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in
the structure of our society’; and (2) the state’s ‘independent interest in the wellbeing of its youth.’” 302
The State of California argued that these two justifications for allowing
regulation of obscene content to minors in Ginsberg should be equally applicable
to the regulation of violent content to minors. 303 The Ninth Circuit, however,
disagreed relying on the established jurisprudence of obscenity, “which relates to
non-protected sex-based expression-not violent content.” 304 The circuit court
reasoned that when the Supreme Court in Ginsberg allowed the State of New York
to regulate obscenity as to minors, it created a sub-category of obscenity that was
not protected by the First Amendment as opposed to “an entirely new category of
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the power to exclude material defined as obscenity by [the statute] only requires that we be able to say
that is was not irrational for the legislature to find that exposure to material condemned by the statute is
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expression excepted from First Amendment protection.” 305 Thus, it determined
that the Ginsberg “variable obscenity” approach was inapplicable to the present
California statute regulating violent video game content to minors.
The Ninth Circuit also noted the Supreme Court’s careful limitation of
obscenity to sexual material in the past. 306 This included the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Roth and Miller, which expressly confined the meaning of obscenity
to sex-based material. 307 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the opinions
from other circuits including Kendrick, in which the Seventh Circuit upheld the
distinction between obscenity and violence. 308 The Ninth Circuit also pointed to
decisions in the Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, where the circuit courts
declined the opportunity to extend the obscenity standard to violent content. 309 In
addition, the circuit court returned to the Ginsberg holding pointing to the Supreme
Court’s own limitation of its ruling:
We have no occasion in this case to consider the impact of the guarantees of
freedom of expression upon the totality of the relationship of the minor and the
State. It is enough for the purposes of this case that we inquire whether it was
constitutionally impermissible for New York . . . to accord minors under 17 a more
restricted right than that assured to adults to judge and determine for themselves
what sex material they may read or see. 310

Thus, the Ninth Circuit viewed Ginsberg to apply only in the context where the
state intends to regulate the availability of sexually based material to minors, not
violent material. 311 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit declined the State’s invitation
to expand the Ginsberg application to violent content and held that strict scrutiny
remains the applicable standard of review. 312
Under the strict scrutiny standard, 313 the California legislature advanced two
compelling state interests: “(1) ‘preventing violent aggressive and antisocial
behavior;’ and (2) ‘preventing psychological or neurological harm to minors who
play violent video games.’” 314 However, California clarified its interest as
protecting the “physical and psychological well-being of the children,” as opposed
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Schwarzenegger,, 556 F.3d at 960.
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Id.; see James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
obscenity jurisprudence did not extend to violent material); Eclipse Enters, Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63,
66–68 (2d Cir. 1997) (declining to put violent material “allegedly harmful to minors in the category of
unprotected obscenity.”); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1992)
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be obscene.”).
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to protecting third parties from violent behavior. 315
Just as previous courts had recognized this interest as compelling, the Ninth
Circuit also found the stated interest in protecting the physical and psychological
well-being of children as an acceptable compelling interest. 316 Despite the
recognition that such an interest is compelling, the State must also “demonstrate
that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural.” 317 Before analyzing the
State’s interest, the Ninth Circuit clarified that California’s asserted interest in
protecting children from actual harm to their psychological health is separate and
distinct from the State’s interest in controlling minor’s thought. 318 “The latter is
not legitimate.” 319 As such, the State must show it has drawn “reasonable
inferences” from the evidence presented that there is an actual harm to protect
against. 320
With this standard in mind, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the State’s evidence,
which was heavily concentrated on the work of Dr. Craig Anderson. 321 Despite
Dr. Anderson’s claims that exposure to violent video games is linked to increases
in aggressive behavior, he admitted the shortcomings in the size of his study
groups and “‘glaring empirical gap’ in video game violence research,” that
undermined his assertions. 322 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit noted the past circuit
and district courts that repeatedly dismissed Dr. Anderson’s research as
insufficient and/or inadequate. 323 The second study relied on by the State was
conducted by Dr. Douglas Gentile, who concluded that eighth and ninth graders
who were exposed to violent video games were more hostile, which affected their
performance socially and academically in school. 324 However, the Ninth Circuit
found this evidence also lacked substantiality because of the admitted
“correlational nature” of the data gathered as well as the express disclaimers given
in the study against drawing any causal conclusions. 325
The circuit court also reviewed two supplemental studies cited by the State in
support of its asserted compelling interest, but these studies failed for the same
reasons as Dr. Anderson and Dr. Gentile’s studies. 326 Thus, based on these
findings, the Ninth Circuit determined the State failed to meet its burden that there
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is a legitimate and compelling interest in protecting the psychological health of
children since it could not provide substantial evidence to show that there is a
causal relationship between exposure to violent video games and actual, physical
harm to the brain. 327
The Ninth Circuit did not stop its analysis there. It concluded that even if the
State had proven that there is a compelling interest in preventing psychological
harm to children, it cannot show that the proposed law is narrowly tailored to
further that interest, nor can it demonstrate that the law is the least restrictive
alternative. 328 In making this determination, the circuit court cited the State’s
misplaced focus on the “‘most effective’ means” of achieving its declared interest,
as opposed to focusing on the “least restrictive means.” 329 This misguided
emphasis included the State’s argument that the ESRB ratings posted on video
games are ineffective and that parental control technologies fail to appropriately
address the State’s concerns. 330 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit pointed out the
existence of less restrictive alternatives dismissed by the State including improved
education campaigns regarding the ESRB ratings directed at both parents and
retailers. 331 As such, the Ninth Circuit determined that California’s proposed law
failed the strict scrutiny analysis rendering the law presumptively invalid. 332
The Ninth Circuit also addressed whether the statute’s labeling provision,
which required all “violent video games” be labeled with a four square inch sticker
stating “18,” was constitutional. 333 The video game publishers argued that such a
requirement is unconstitutionally compelled speech, since it conveys a message
with which the plaintiffs do not agree. 334 Before beginning its analysis, the court
stated the relevant law that “freedom of speech prohibits the government from
telling people what they must say.” 335 However, there is an exception to this rule
when the government attempts to prohibit “commercial speech,” which is used in
advertisements and defined as “purely factual and uncontroversial information.”
336

The Ninth Circuit determined that the constitutionality of the labeling
requirement was dependent on the court’s prior determination that the law’s
prohibition on the distribution of violent video games to minors is
unconstitutional. 337 It reasoned that, “[u]nless the Act can clearly and legally
characterize a video game as ‘violent’ and not subject to First Amendment
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protections, the ‘18’ sticker does not convey factual information.” 338 Additionally,
“the State’s mandated label would . . . convey a false statement that certain
conduct is illegal when it is not,” and, therefore, the State cannot require retailers
to display false information on their products. 339 Thus, the labeling requirement
was ruled unconstitutional. 340
In its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit summarized its findings and repeated its
disinclination to apply Ginsberg’s “variable obscenity standard” to the California
statute. 341 Thus, it affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the
plaintiffs based on the conclusion that the California statute was unconstitutional in
all respects. 342 Accordingly, California reimbursed the EMA for costs incurred
because of the appeal in the amount of $282,794. 343
Despite defeat in both the district and circuit courts, California successfully
appealed the case to the Supreme Court of the United States on grant of
certiorari. 344 To date, state and local taxpayers have paid the video game industry
an estimated $2,158,916 in attorney’s fees and expenses as the result of the
lawsuits generated by failed legislation.
VI. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
On June 27, 2011, the Supreme Court issued its opinion on the
constitutionality of California’s violent video game ban in Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Ass’n. In its 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court made three major
holdings: (1) video games are deserving of First Amendment protection; (2) while
there are limited exceptions to the prohibition against content-based governmental
restrictions on expressions such as obscenity, incitement, and fighting words, new
categories of unprotected speech may not be added; and (3) California failed to
satisfy the burden of showing either that the law was justified by a compelling
government interest, or that the law was narrowly drawn to serve that interest. 345
Justice Antonin Scalia 346 wrote the opinion in which the Supreme Court
expressed its view on violence in the media and the government’s role in
protecting minors from certain media content. After briefly summarizing the
procedural history of the case, the Court explicitly affirmed the well-accepted
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principle that video games qualify for First Amendment protection. 347 The Court
likened video games to other forms of entertainment, namely books, plays and
movies. 348 Although video games are distinct because of the player’s ability to
interact within a virtual world, the Court reasoned that because video games
communicate ideas and messages (just like books, movies, and plays), they are
worthy of full First Amendment protection. 349 The Court’s most notable
evaluation, however, was its implication that future technologies will be subject to
the same protections of the First Amendment. 350 Specifically, the Court stated that
“whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing
technology, the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First
Amendment’s command, do not vary when a new and different medium for
communication appears.” 351
To support this reasoning, the Court referred to Ashcroft v. American Civil
Liberties Union, which held that “as a general matter, . . . government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or
its content.” 352 The Court, however, was quick to acknowledge that there are
exceptions to this rule, specifically with respect to the areas of obscenity,
incitement, and fighting words. 353
The opinion next discussed its last term ruling from the case of U.S. v.
Stevens, in which the Supreme Court struck down a statute criminalizing the
creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty. 354 Reiterating its
previous holding, the Court explained that such restrictions on the depiction of
animal cruelty were unconstitutional. However, laws forbidding the actual
commission of such acts were permissible. 355 In Stevens, the government made a
similar appeal to the Court, arguing that if the determined value of a particular
category of speech was outweighed by the social costs, then that category of
speech should be punishable. 356 The Court related how it objected to such a
conclusion because “without persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on
content is part of a long . . . tradition of proscription, a legislature may not revise
the judgment of the American people . . . .” 357 The Court determined that these
same principles control in the case of restrictions on the distribution of video
347
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733 (stating that “California correctly acknowledges that video games
qualify for First Amendment protection.”). While this qualification was already well accepted and
established, the Supreme Court’s own affirmation of this principle is historical because this is the first
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games. 358
In light of this finding, the opinion next explained how California’s
regulation is just another attempt by the legislature to “shoehorn speech about
violence into obscenity.” 359 This discussion included the Court’s comparison of
the California’s violent video game regulation to the New York law that prohibited
the sale of certain sexual content to minors in Ginsberg. 360 The Supreme Court
found it was of no consequence that California’s statute mimicked the
constitutional law in Ginsberg, since speech about violence is not obscene, and
therefore cannot be treated as such. 361 The Court further distinguished the present
case from Ginsberg by stating that the California law “does not adjust the
boundaries of an existing category of unprotected speech to ensure that a definition
designed for adults is not uncritically applied to children . . . . Instead, it wishes to
create a wholly new category of content-based regulation that is permissible only
for speech directed at children.” 362 According to the Court, such a departure from
the traditions of regulated speech is “unprecedented and mistaken.” 363
While the Court recognized that the State has a legitimate concern of
protecting children from exposure to harmful media, this does not give California
the limitless power to restrict the ideas and messages it believes are harmful to
children. 364 The Court quoted its previous decision in Erznozik v. Jacksonville, for
emphasis that “[s]peech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some
other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from
ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.” 365 The Court
then went on to explore the longstanding history of violence in children’s media,
most notably in children’s books. 366 The depictions of violence in fairytales such
as Snow White and classics such as Homer’s Odyssey are just a few examples that
illustrate the tradition of children’s exposure to violent content. 367
This led the Court to relate the history of action taken to restrict violent
entertainment to minors. 368 The first “villain” was dime novels depicting crime,
followed by motion pictures, radio dramas, and comic books. 369 After that came
television and music. 370 And most recently, violent video games are the perceived
threat to children.
At this point, the Court addressed California’s argument that video games are
distinguishable from other forms of media because they are interactive in that the
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player participates in the violence and determines its outcome. 371 The Court,
however, found this distinction uncompelling for two reasons. 372 First, with
respect to controlling the outcome of the game, this is a common feature akin to
“choose-your-own-adventure stories,” which have been around since 1969. 373
Second, as for the player’s participation, the Court viewed this as “more a matter
of degree than kind.” 374 This increased interactivity, however, is not a strike
against video games, and is in fact, a testament to their success at drawing the
player into the experience. 375
The Court also addressed the concern with the goriness and severity of the
violence depicted in the video games. 376 While the Court acknowledged its disgust
with the graphic depictions of dismemberment, decapitation, and disembowelment,
“disgust is not a valid basis for restricting expression.” 377 Indeed, the Court
observed that these images are so intense that it ignites the viewer’s desire to put
an end to this violence, but therein lies the problem with California’s legislation:
“that the ideas expressed by speech – whether it be violence, or gore, or racism –
and not its objective effects, may be the real reason for government
proscription.” 378 This is precisely the type of regulation that the First Amendment
is designed to prevent.
After its analysis rendering video games fully protected by the First
Amendment, the Court found that California’s statute could only survive
constitutional challenge if it met the burden of the strict scrutiny test. 379 This
required that California’s regulation on the distribution of violent video games to
minors to be justified by a compelling government interest, 380 and that the law be
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 381 Putting this standard into context,
California must specify an actual problem that needs solving, and show that
restriction on free speech is necessary to that solution. 382
Applying this high standard, the Court determined that California could not
meet the first part of the test since it could not prove there is an actual problem in
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need of a solution. 383 In his opinion, Justice Scalia was quick to point out that
California admits that “it cannot show a direct causal link between the violent
video games and harm to minors.” 384 Furthermore, the Court found the State’s
evidence was not compelling for several reasons. First, the State’s reliance on the
research of Dr. Anderson and a handful of other psychologists was misplaced since
“[t]hey do not prove that violent video games cause minors to act aggressively
(which would at least be a beginning).” 385 Rather these studies indicate there is
merely a correlation between children’s exposure to violent entertainment and
“miniscule real-world effects, such as children’s feeling more aggressive or
making louder noises in the few minutes after playing a violent video game than
after playing a nonviolent game.” 386 Moreover, when presented with these studies,
every court has rejected them. 387
The Court’s opinion then pointed out that one of the most glaring problems
in Dr. Anderson’s research is that the effects caused by violent video games are
small and indistinguishable compared to the effects caused by other media. Most
notably, Dr. Anderson admitted the effects on children who play violent video
games are “the same effects [that] have been found when children watch cartoons
starring Bugs Bunny or the Road Runner, or when they play video games like
Sonic the Hedgehog that are rated ‘E’ or even when they view a picture of a
gun.” 388 In light of the finding that California seeks to protect children from the
harmful effects of violent media by restricting the sale of violent video games only,
the Court concluded the California statute was wildly underinclusive. 389 The
Court took issue with this result since it “raises serious doubts about whether the
government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a
particular speaker or viewpoint.” 390
Additionally, the Court concluded that the California law is also
underinclusive for the reason that the statute allows these allegedly “dangerous,
mind-altering” games to find their way into the hands of minors so long as a parent
or guardian gives them permission. 391 The opinion expressed the Court’s “doubts
that punishing third parties for conveying protected speech to children just in case
their parents disprove of that speech is a proper governmental means of aiding
parental authority.” 392
Furthermore, the Court found that the California law did not substantially
assist parents who wish to restrict their child’s access to violent video games, but
383
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are unable to do so. 393 In his analysis of this conclusion, Scalia highlighted the
fact that the video game industry already has a voluntary rating system in place
that addresses parental concerns by identifying the content of the game. 394
Moreover, he noted that the VSDA encourages game distributors to exhibit
information the ESRB rating system in their stores and to abide by the system by
refusing to sell “M” rated titles to minors without parental consent. 395 Scalia also
found the results of the FTC’s latest report on the marketing of violent media to
children compelling. 396 The opinion recounted the FTC’s summary finding in
which “the video game industry outpaces the movie and music industries” in the
three areas of most concern: “(1) restricting target-marketing of mature-rated
products to children; (2) clearly and prominently disclosing rating information; and
(3) restricting children’s access to mature-rated products at retail.” 397 In light of
the effectiveness of the video game industry’s self-regulation, the Court found that
“[f]illing the remaining modest gap in concerned-parents’ control can hardly be a
compelling state interest.” 398
Aside from the law’s underinclusiveness, the Court found the law
overinclusive as well with respect to the claim that such a law supplements
parental authority. 399 Scalia’s opinion pointed out that the California regulation
does not take into account the fact that some children who will be prohibited from
purchasing video games under the law have parents who do not care whether their
child is buying violent video games. 400 As a result, the law’s purported aim to
assist parental authority actually supports only what “the State thinks parents ought
to want.” 401 This overinclusiveness demonstrated that the California law was not
narrowly tailored to serve its supposed compelling interest. 402
Before giving his final thoughts, Scalia qualified the opinion by stating that
“[w]hile we have pointed out above that some of the evidence brought forward to
support the harmfulness of video games is unpersuasive, we do not mean to
demean or disparage the concerns that underlie the attempt to regulate
them . . . .” 403 The Supreme Court did not intend to pass judgment on California’s
concern that violent video games may corrupt the minds of the young; however,
the Court must respect the government confines when it comes to restricting
constitutionally protected speech and expression. 404
In closing, Scalia acknowledged that California’s presented interests in “(1)
393
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addressing a serious social problem and (2) helping concerned parents control their
children,” were legitimate. 405 The law intended to incorporate these concerns,
As a result,
however, was fatally underinclusive and overinclusive. 406
“[l]egislation such as this, which is neither fish nor fowl, cannot survive strict
scrutiny,” 407 and therefore, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit was affirmed. 408
Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the final judgment;
however, their concurrence articulated their disagreement with the Court’s
treatment of video games as just another form of media, as opposed to an evolving
new technology. 409 Specifically, the concurrence speculated that “[t]here are
reasons to suspect that the experiences of playing video games just might be very
different from reading a book, listening to the radio, or watching a movie or
television show.” 410 The concurrence then proceeded to conduct a more in depth
analysis of the comparison of California’s video game regulation to the statute at
issue in Ginsberg. 411
As an additional point of contention, the concurrence disagreed with the
majority’s assessment that Stevens controls. 412 The concurrence distinguished the
present law from that at issue in Stevens by observing that the statutes in Stevens
prohibited any person from creating, selling, or possessing depictions of animal
cruelty, while California’s law specifically prohibited the sale of violent video
games to minors. 413 Second, the concurrence stated that Stevens does not support
the majority’s application of the strict scrutiny standard to the California law.
Lastly, Alito expressed his disapproval with the majority opinion’s sweeping
decision, which was unlike that in Stevens where the Court left the door open for a
later, more narrowly tailored statute to be found constitutional. 414 Alito’s
concurrence expressed the concern that the majority decision will be interpreted as
indicating that no regulation of a minor’s access to violent video games is ever
allowed. 415 As such, Alito believed that a properly drafted statute framed within
constitutional requirements may be permitted and thus, the majority failed to leave
room for this possibility. 416
As for the dissent, Justice Thomas and Justice Breyer authored their own
separate opinions. Justice Thomas’ dissent took the view that the majority
improperly extended the protections of the First Amendment. 417 Instead, Justice
Thomas believed the present case encompasses a new category of speech: “speech
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to minor children bypassing their parents.” 418 Thomas then went on to relate the
history of parents having authority over what their children are exposed to. 419
Based on Thomas’s historical analysis in which parents exhibited complete
authority over their children, he concluded that “the Framers could not possibly
have understood ‘the freedom of speech’ to include an unqualified right to speak to
minors.” 420 Accordingly, a law abridging speech that addresses minors without
parental consent does not violate the First Amendment. 421 In conclusion, Justice
Thomas reasoned that:
Where a minor has a parent or guardian . . . the law does not prevent that minor
from obtaining a violent video game with his parent’s or guardian’s help. In the
typical case, the only speech affected is speech that bypasses a minor’s parent or
guardian. Because such speech does not fall within the “freedom of speech” as
originally understood, California’s law does not ordinarily implicate the First
Amendment and is not facially unconstitutional. 422

Conversely, Justice Breyer believed the California law was constitutional
and comported with the First Amendment. 423 Firstly, Breyer stated that the
applicable standards of review in determining the constitutionality of California’s
video game regulation are the vagueness precedents and the strict scrutiny test. 424
The relevant category of speech for this type of review, however, is not depictions
of violence, but rather is the category of “protection of children.” 425
Under the vagueness analysis, Breyer found the California statute provided
sufficient notice of what is prohibited under the law, and therefore was not
impermissibly vague. 426 Additionally, California’s law was no more vague than
New York’s statute in Ginsberg. 427 Accordingly, any issues of remaining
confusion could be cured through the state courts’ interpretation. 428
Breyer then proceeded to apply the standard of strict scrutiny to California’s
video game regulation, but with the opposite result from the majority. 429 To arrive
at this result, Breyer determined that both California’s interest in addressing a
social problem and in aiding parental authority are legitimate, and indeed, are
furthered by the California legislation. 430 According to Breyer, the California law
achieved these aims since it only prevents a minor from buying a violent video
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game without a parent’s permission. 431 Furthermore, video games are accepted
teaching tools, and therefore, properly regulating the distribution of video games
deemed exceedingly violent will further California’s aim of protecting the physical
and psychological well-being of minors. 432 Breyer admittedly found the scientific
studies and reports presented by the State in its argument compelling, unlike the
majority, in this respect. 433
Because Breyer concluded that the California law passes the first part of the
strict scrutiny test, he continued his analysis with the application of the second part
of the test, which is whether there were any less restrictive means that would
accomplish California’s objectives. 434 In his brief analysis on this second part of
the test, Breyer made the cursory finding that the video game industry’s selfimplemented regulations have failed to achieve the goal of ensuring that minors do
not have access to mature-rated video games, and therefore, there are no less
restrictive alternatives. 435
In conclusion, Breyer posited that the majority’s decision creates an anomaly
in First Amendment law. 436 Specifically, Breyer cannot reconcile the majority’s
ruling in light of the Ginsberg holding, which begs the question, “what sense does
it make to forbid selling a 13-year-old boy a magazine with an image of a nude
woman, while protecting a sale to that 13-year-old of an interactive video game in
which he actively, but virtually, binds and gags the woman, then tortures and kills
her?” 437
Breyer concluded his dissent with the opinion that Ginsberg controls the
outcome of the case and therefore, California’s violent video game regulation was
constitutional on its face. 438 Moreover, Breyer imparted that the present case is
more about education than censorship. 439 As such, the First Amendment does not
prevent the government from assisting parents with their children’s education
about matters of violence. 440
VII. POTENTIAL IMPACT ON VIDEO GAME INDUSTRY
Although the Supreme Court has affirmed that California’s regulation on the
distribution of violent video games is unconstitutional, it is still productive to
explore the potential impact a constitutional regulation would have on the business
of the video game industry.
While it is difficult to predict the effects of enforcing such a violent video
game regulation without being flooded by dramatic claims that the video game

431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440

Id. at 2766.
Id. at 2767.
Id. at 2767–70.
Id. at 2770.
Id.
Id. at 2771.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

130

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW

Vol. V:I

industry would fade into obscurity, there is some truth to the negative impact video
game regulation would have on the industry and the economy. If a statute similar
to California’s law were put into effect, retailers and video game developers would
be liable for fines of up to $1,000 for each violation. 441 Additionally, the law
provides guidelines for reporting suspected violations to the city or district
attorney, giving overly protective parents more than enough ammo to bring
retailers under fire who sell video games that remotely portray some form of
“violence.” 442 Thus, there is little exaggeration to the conclusion that the creation
of M-rated games would decrease substantially since retailers would not want to
risk the liability of selling such games illegally to minors. This unwillingness to
distribute such M-rated games would create a domino effect reaching not only
game publishers, who will not produce games that could not be sold, but also
developers, who actually design and create video games. Although, the majority
of the video game industry’s revenue comes from the sale of E-rated games, 443 half
of the top-selling games for 2010 were M-rated games. 444 Thus, a regulation
imposing penalties for distributing such games to minors would inevitably drive
video game developers away from producing games that could incur a fine. 445
Additionally, legal minded experts predict that original titles, i.e. games
owned by publishers with established franchises including Call of Duty and Grand
Theft Auto, would be affected first. 446 This would take place in the form of
modifying existing original titles in order to avoid the risk for penalties and to
avoid publishing an “unproven commodity” that could be deemed too violent. 447
In addition, the brunt of the risk will be put on smaller, independent developers
since they produce and publish their own games. 448 Thus, if a title does not
procure revenue, the independent developers will be not be able to afford the costs
of creating their next project. As publishers shift the pressure from the retailers to
developers to create statutorily acceptable games, it is unlikely independent
developers will survive when it is uncertain whether their titles will be distributed,
drastically affecting sales. 449 Thus, it is likely more development projects will
move away from independent studios who cannot afford to take risks with creating
a game that may fail to be published. 450
In light of the uncertainty with which such legislation would be applied,
production of games would most likely take longer to reach completion in order
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for developers to carefully traverse the murky waters of what constitutes a
regulated violent video game. Or, games will continue to be produced on time;
however, the detail and precision with which games are normally produced will
decline out of an abundance of caution by developers, resulting in generic and
unoriginal video game content. Thus, content and creativity alike would suffer.
There is genuine concern among video game consumers, dubbed “gamers,”
that any regulation on the sale of video games will affect the games they’ve come
to know and love. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, Ronald Williams, an
avid gamer who has been playing video games since he was three-years-old,
voiced his concern that “if [the law] were to pass, it would severely limit what
developers produce and make, on top of a lot of revenue being lost.” 451 Williams
expressed his fear that “the future game experience will change,” and that there
will be a “[s]carlet letter on any [game] above a Teen [ESRB] rating.” 452
Moreover, Williams stated, “this isn’t the end of the regulation of video game
content,” a topic which he feels strongly about. 453 As a consumer, Williams feels
he’s virtually powerless to stop the state from generating legislation that threatens
to erode his favorite hobby. 454
The courts have also recognized this “chilling effect” on creativity. In
Blagojevich, the district court quoted Ted Price, the President and CEO of
Insomniac Games, as saying that, “creators will be unable to determine what is
regulated, forcing them to eliminate anything in their games that resembles
violence.” 455 As an example Price expressed his would-be reluctance to include
even cartoon violence in his games. 456 Furthermore, courts have recognized that
laws regulating the distribution of violent video games will place the burden on
retailers, who “would likely steer clear of any game with the potential of such
violence in order to avoid civil and criminal liability, thus denying constitutionally
protected free speech to minors and adults.” 457
With severe limitations in place, it is likely that consumers, publishers, and
developers will turn to the Internet for “hard-core” games, as least initially. 458 The
access to downloadable content, however, will only be uninhibited for so long, as
legislation similar to that regulating retail sales will be drafted for distribution of
downloadable content. 459 If such legislation were enacted to regulate the internet,
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there is no question that the limitations on video developers would begin to
infringe on individual freedoms of creative expression as well. User-generated
conduct, 460 while currently less expansive than originally predicted, is still a
significant contributor to video game content. There are top-ten lists for usergenerated games and iPhone or iPad applications, 461 revealing how pervasive some
user-generated content can be. If legislation regulating online video game content
is enacted to follow suit with California’s video game regulation, user-generated
content will inevitably become an area of conflict as individuals will be subject to
tailoring their own creative expressions. Thus, there is potential for video game
regulation to threaten personal First Amendment freedoms in a very serious way.
In recognizing the economic hit that the video game industry will inevitably
take if California’s statute is upheld as constitutional, there will also be a ripple
effect on employment. California is the largest employer of game software
personnel, comprising approximately 41% of the total number of U.S. workers in
the video game publishing industry. 462 The decrease in video game revenue that
would likely result, should California’s statute be enforced, would lead to loss of
jobs in California’s already depressed job market. 463 Additionally, in 2009, the
value that the entertainment software industry added to the United States’ gross
domestic product was $4.95 billion. 464 Thus, on a larger scale, decreases in the
earnings of the video game industry will negatively impact the contributions to the
United States economy. 465
Lastly, the passage of any future regulation regarding the distribution of
violent video games would most likely trigger the enactment of similar legislation
across the country. Thus, the economic and creative impact felt locally would
spread across the country.
Despite the outcome in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, there is no
guarantee that such a decision is a “clear-cut win.” 466 In light of the Court’s
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decision that there may some day be a constitutional law regulating video game
distribution, state legislatures may continue to test the boundaries with new statutes
and laws aimed at fitting within the constitutional confines set by the Supreme
Court. Only time will tell. 467
VIII. CONCLUSION
Throughout history, society has repeatedly cried “wolf” whenever a new
form of media emerges. While the initial panic often results in strict regulations on
the distribution and creation of such media, inevitably it becomes apparent that
there is no “wolf” to be afraid of. Most recently, the “wolf” has taken the form of
violent video games; however, the Supreme Court has held that California’s cry is
nothing more than a false alarm. Although such a decision was expected and the
Supreme Court has firmly established that new categories of unprotected speech
cannot be added to the existing categories of obscenity, fighting words, and
incitement, there is no guarantee that the cry of “wolf” will be silenced for long.
While the decision marks a definitive victory for the video game and entertainment
industries, video games are simply the latest medium to cause society concern, and
it is unlikely that they will be the last.
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